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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court made it clear in Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder' that local governments are subject to
antitrust suits unless they can show that the state action immunity
doctrine of Parker v. Brown' shields their conduct. Almost as soon
as the Court decided Boulder, local government officials and their
trade association representatives descended upon Congress to de-
mand legislation that would reduce their exposure to antitrust lia-
*Associate Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law. A substantial
portion of this article will appear in a forthcoming book by the same author, ANTITRUST LAW
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, published by Greenwood Press. The author would like to express
his appreciation to Lynn Taylor at Greenwood Press, who is Editor of Quorum Books. The
author would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Lynn Sedlack Flint, of Greenwood
Press, and Vera Felts, of the Southern Illinois University School of Law, in the preparation
of -this article.
1. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). The city of Boulder, through broad powers granted by the state
constitution, passed a moratorium ordinance preventing a cable television company from
expanding its services. The company sought an injunction and the Court held that the mor-
atorium ordinance was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
2. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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bility. Their lobbying reached a fevered pitch when, for the first
time, a court entered a judgment for treble damages against a local
government, the town of Grayslake, Illinois.' The lobbyists as-
serted straightforward arguments:4 Local governments have com-
monly engaged in practices that are identical or closely analogous
to those of private enterprise, and those practices are subject to
extensive antitrust scrutiny and occasional condemnation. Without
fairly iron-clad immunity from suit, local governments engaging in
business as usual would risk incurring budget-busting litigation
costs and adverse antitrust judgments, including the possibility of
treble damage awards. The lobbyists claimed that the enormity of
the risks would force local governments to substantially reduce
their use of those common practices and concomitantly, the pro-
grams accompanying those practices. Thus, they concluded, unless
Congress adopted some "Boulder legislation," the antitrust jugger-
naut unleashed by the Court would smash local government as we
now know it.5
Congress apparently found the argument and the lobbying
persuasive for it passed a bill which, upon President Reagan's sig-
nature, became the Local Government Antitrust Act ("Act") of
1984.' That Act bars claimants seeking treble damage (except
those who filed before September 24, 1984) from obtaining any
monetary relief from local governments if the perpetrators of the
offenses acted in an official capacity. This bar will reduce the gain
that some potential claimants will expect to realize from antitrust
3. Unity Ventures v. Village of Grayslake, 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
1157, at 595 (1984).
4. For similar arguments, see City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 438-40 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State
Action" after Lafayette, 95 HARv. L. REv. 435 (1981); Civiletti, The Fallout from Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: Prospects for a Legislative Solution, 32 CATH.
U.L. REv. 379, 385-86, 388 (1983); Note, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder:
The Emasculation of Municipal Immunity from Sherman Act Liability, 32 CATH. U.L. Rv.
413, 432 (1983). Lobbyists also argued that the Court's decisions would dramatically alter
the relationships between state and local government, in general, and the "home rule"
movement, in particular. See also 435 U.S. at 435-38; Bangasser, Exposure of Municipal
Corporations to Liability for Violations of the Antitrust Laws: Antitrust Immunity after
the City of Lafayette Decision, 11 UR. LAW. vii (1979); Civiletti, supra note 4, at 387-89;
Note, supra note 4, at 431; Comment, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.:
Will Municipal Antitrust Liability Doom Effective State-Local Government Relations?, 36
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 129 (1979).
5. "The Court's decision in this case is flawed in two serious respects, and will thereby
impede, if not paralyze, local governments' efforts to enact ordinances and regulations
aimed at protecting public health, safety, and welfare.. .", 455 U.S. 40, 60 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); accord 435 U.S. 426 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Civiletti, supra note 4, at 387.
6. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750.
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claims against local governments. It will also result in the filing of
fewer claims against local governments. The fewer claims filed, the
smaller the threat posed to local governments by post-Boulder an-
titrust actions.
Many claimants will still file claims. The Act will not deter the
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice from fil-
ing claims in the course of their enforcement work. Nor will it de-
ter many private enterprises from filing claims. Even before the
passage of the Act, some antitrust claimants against local govern-
ments sought only equitable relief, and many others must have
known that it was unlikely that they could obtain more than equi-
table relief. The plaintiffs in the Boulder case exemplified such
claimants. The Act creates no bar for them; they may still obtain
equitable relief along with "the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."8 The Act may increase the chances that such
claimants will obtain that relief because it renders the remedy at
law-monetary damages-inadequate. In any event, it should not
reduce the number of claims that these potential claimants file.
Also, it should not affect those initiating disputes with local gov-
ernment who realize they could press antitrust claims at a rather
small incremental cost. This group includes any who could plausi-
bly challenge the government's actions not only on antitrust
grounds, but also on a deprivation of constitutional rights, a breach
of contract, a tort, or other ground. There are apparently many
who could mount such a challenge. In the reported cases dealing
with antitrust claims against local governments, most of the claim-
ants did just that, including the claimants in Boulder and those in
7. For some of those potential claimants, the reduction in expected gain will be small.
Many of them will have little hope of proving that they suffered any damages as a result of
a local government's alleged misbehavior, and even less hope of proving that whatever dam-
ages they did suffer stemmed from an antitrust injury. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). These claimants can reasonably expect to obtain
monetary relief equal only to the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee,
discounted by the probability of prevailing. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984
will not change this situation at all.
Of course, claimants who filed before September 24, 1984, might still reasonably expect
to obtain that relief, and perhaps more. These claimants number "in the hundreds" accord-
ing to the National Law Journal. New Antitrust Act May do Little to Stem Suits, NAT'L L.
J., Dec. 3, 1984, at 1, col. 4. The Act provides that the bar to obtaining monetary relief
"shall not apply to cases commenced before the effective date of [the] Act unless the defen-
dant establishes, and the court determines, in light of all the circumstances, including the
stage of litigation and the availability of alternative relief under the Clayton Act, that it
would be inequitable not to apply this subsection to a pending case." 15 U.S.C.A. § 35(b)
(Supp. 1985).
8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (Supp. 1985).
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the Court's original city immunity case, City of Lafayette v. Loui-
siana Power & Light.9 This group also includes any defendant
sued by a local government who could file a colorable counterclaim
as an antitrust offense, attacking behavior connected with the un-
derlying claim. The antitrust claimants in Lafayette were such de-
fendants. Even those who would find it expensive to press an anti-
trust claim against local government will do so if they perceive a
reasonable chance of persuading a fact finder that the perpetrators
of the offense did not act in an official capacity."0 Because it is
likely that local governments will continue to be named in a sizable
number of antitrust claims despite the Act, it is also likely that the
Act will not seriously reduce the threat posed by post-Boulder an-
titrust law.
The purpose of this article is not to criticize the Act for failing
to substantially protect local governments. Despite the Grayslake
treble damage award, it is doubtful that local governments require
much protection from antitrust law. Those who lobbied for the Act
exaggerated the risks that Boulder and Lafayette created, because
they ignored the possibility that courts might reassess the merits
of the challenged practices when the courts removed local govern-
ment immunity. Such a reassessment would involve grappling with
two questions: What is the real objection to the practices, even
when they are employed by private enterprises; and, would sus-
taining a challenge on that basis be consistent with the purpose of
the antitrust statutes? Answering those questions would reveal
that most of the challenged practices are objectionable, if at all,
only on the basis of populist notions about the distribution of
wealth between private enterprises. It is considered desirable, per-
haps for political and social reasons, to prefer "smaller," "less ad-
vantaged" firms to "larger," "more advantaged" firms in a quest
for egalitarianism." But those populist notions, whatever their
merits, do not address disputes between local government and pri-
9. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
10. This group will consist largely of those who can show that the perpetrators failed to
discharge their responsibilities to constituents, or otherwise breached the duties imposed by
nonantitrust law. The plaintiffs in Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston would have
belonged to this group. 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir.),
vacated, 714 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd on reh'g 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
For an analysis of the relationship between such misbehavior and antitrust law, see infra
notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text.
11. In some cases even these unofficial populist notions would not justify condemnation
of the practices. See, e.g., Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131
(8th Cir. 1970); Heille v. City of St. Paul, 512 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1981), affd, 671 F.2d
1134 (8th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 39:589
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vate enterprise. Moreover, local government probably holds a
higher place than any other institution in the pantheon of popu-
lism. Therefore, courts undertaking this reassessment would pre-
sumably find the practices lawful. Such findings would reduce the
risk of incurring adverse judgments that result in budget-busting
litigation costs. It could also produce some extraordinary changes
in antitrust law. The principal purposes of this article are to
demonstrate how that reassessment might, and should, be con-
ducted, and to identify what changes might occur.
II. REASSESSMENT: THE INTELLECTUAL PROCESS
To discover the actual objection to a challenged practice, a
judge would have to ascertain the functions that the practice was
supposed to serve and to find an antitrust principle inconsistent
with those functions. Before describing that intellectual process, an
explanation must be given of why the process would focus on what
the practice was supposed to do, rather than focusing on what it
did do. Such a focus is consistent with, and probably dictated by,
the consumer welfare goal of the antitrust laws. In most cases an
inquiry into the actual impact of a particular practice would be
extraordinarily time-consuming and, in the end, fruitless. 12 Even if
that were not so, it would nonetheless be inefficient. A practice
would fail to serve its supposed function only if its users miscalcu-
lated or misbehaved. If they miscalculated, subjecting them to an-
titrust sanctions would be unnecessary because the market would
punish them. Worse still, subjecting them to antitrust sanctions
would deter others from correctly using the practice because of the
fear that they too would miscalculate, or because of the risk that a
court might err in assessing the actual impact of the practice. If
the users of the practice misbehaved by taking advantage of their
principals-or perhaps selling them out-then the antitrust laws
would not address their conduct. Current antitrust laws are simply
not designed to limit the opportunistic behavior of agents.13 They
12. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 128-29 (1978). Cf.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
13. It is difficult for any principal to absolutely control the behavior of his agent. Ad-
mittedly, it is particularly difficult for citizens to control the behavior of their agents be-
cause it is usually costly for those citizens to give directions, to ascertain whether their
directions are being followed, and if not, to revoke the authority granted to act on their
behalf. These problems, no matter how acute, raise none of the efficiency concerns that are
germane to antitrust law. The Sherman and Clayton Acts do not address any aspect of the
principal-agent relationship. A contrary interpretation would likely have an extraordinarily
wide-ranging, and surely unintended, impact on ordinary business activities. For example, it
19851
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are also not designed to prevent local politicians and bureaucrats
from taking advantage of or selling out their constituents." If they
would probably convert an executive's breach of the fiduciary duty owed to his corporation's
shareholders into an antitrust offense. Moreover, given the Supreme Court's decision in
American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., a contrary interpretation
would likely yield perverse results in litigated cases. 456 U.S. 556 (1982). In Hydrolevel, the
Court held that a principal could be held liable for an antitrust offense committed by his
agents if they acted with apparent authority. Id. at 565-66. Thus, if a failure to do a princi-
pal's bidding constituted an antitrust offense, the principal, who was victimized by that
failure, could be held liable.
14. Of course, local government officials do sometimes act opportunistically, perhaps
engaging in malfeasance or even crime. See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Hous-
ton, 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983), vacated, 714 F.2d
25 (5th Cir.), rev'd on reh'g, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). They may also fail to.
ascertain a court's evaluation of the citizens' demand for a good. (Failing to ascertain what
the court believes to be the citizens' demand schedule for a good could reflect either the
prohibitive cost of ascertainment or honest disagreement). In other words, they may partici-
pate in an exchange that appears to be a bad deal because of corruption, bias, or stupidity.
Rose, Municipal Activities and the Antitrust Laws after City of Lafayette, 57 UNIv. Drr. J.
URB. L. 483, 490-94 (1979). Even so, a court should not rule that the practice constituted an
antitrust offense.
The fact that government officials did not act in a manner consistent with their respon-
sibilities towards citizens was of no consequence under the Sherman or Clayton Acts. Sun
Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969); Huron Valley
Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 1979); contra Cirace, An
Economic Analysis of the "State Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 Tsx. L. REv. 481,
485-86 (1982). It is easier to comprehend the inevitability of that result where there has
been no exchange. For good illustrations of that situation, see Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F.
Supp. 763 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Highfield Water Co. v. Public Service Comm'n [of Md.], 488 F.
Supp. 1176 (D. Md. 1980). Highfield Water developed from an alleged expropriation of a
water utility by government officials who acted in contravention of state regulatory law.
Schiessle arose from an alleged misuse of eminent domain powers by government officials
who planned to transfer property from one real estate developer to a group of others. In
both cases, local government officials allegedly acted in violation of nonantitrust law. Their
actions would have been inconsistent with their responsibilities to local citizens, and injuri-
ous to private enterprise. Such conduct would certainly be objectionable-in fact, it might
expose the actors to suit for failure to abide by state civil statutes or city ordinances, and to
tort actions, or even criminal prosecution-but clearly not on any principle embodied in the
antitrust statutes. The same observation holds for zoning decisions allegedly undertaken for
the benefit of the officials making them. See Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir.
1977), vacated, Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992, on remand, Whitworth v. Perkins, 576
F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Stauffer v. The Town of Grand
Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 64,029 (D.C. Colo. 1980); Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v.
Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 595 F.2d
1213 (3d Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Utah Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,128 (D. Utah 1977).
But cf. Dabney, Antitrust Aspects of Anticompetitive Zoning, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 435
(1979) (arguing that a court should deem a zoning decision an antitrust offense if made for
the purpose of restricting competition or, for some other purpose, if an alternative means
less restrictive of competition is available). Commentator Dabney does not reveal how a
court would go about ascertaining the purpose of a zoning decision. That could be problem-
atic because all denials of zoning changes requested by the owner of the affected property
tend to suppress competition in a sense. Nor does Dabney explain how a court should take
into account efficiency and cost in evaluating alternative means. The same is true of similar
[Vol. 39:589
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were so designed, federal courts would operate as superlegislatures
when applying these laws to local government defendants.
Microeconomics has explained the function of most private
enterprise practices that claimants challenge under antitrust stat-
utes, 15 but it has yet to do the same for local government prac-
tices.1" This contrast may reflect Boulder's recent vintage. Analysts
may not have had sufficient opportunity to develop the required
explanations. Traditionally, practices have been challenged long
before they have been explained,17 but this is not the only possible
reason. An intellectual obstacle may be blocking the development
of any explanations. Local government is institutionally very dif-
ferent from private enterprise. In particular, local government de-
cision-making involves far more voting that is not weighted accord-
ing to wealth, than does private enterprise decision-making.
Furthermore, local government officials are more subject to control
from the residents of the governed community than are officials of
private enterprises. Because of these differences, it would be un-
realistic to adopt the common assumption normally used to de-
scribe private enterprises when discussing local governments. It is
unlikely that local governments act to maximize the wealth of their
principals. Yet, it is precisely that assumption which gives
microeconomics its explanatory power. Consequently, analysts may
be avoiding the development of microeconomic explanations until
they are better able to integrate it with a more advanced theory of
public choice than they currently possess.' 8
A judge undertaking the reassessment of a local government
practice should nonetheless turn to microeconomics for an expla-
nation of the practice's function. The important institutional dif-
ferences between local government and private enterprise are un-
important for the purposes of antitrust analysis. Antitrust does not
speak to the relationship between those who govern and those who
are governed Nor does it speak to decision-making methodology.
In Boulder and Lafayette, the Supreme Court declared its inten-
tion to have those opinions interpreted so that they would not con-
conduct that happens to be related to an exchange. The exchange, in these situations, is
incidental.
15. Easterbrook, Is There A Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 Tax. L. REv. 705 (1982).
16. But see Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir.
1982).
17. Easterbrook, supra note 15.
18. For a discussion of public choice theories, see J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); D. MUmER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); M. OLSON, THE Looic OF
COLLECTVE ACTnoN (1965); G. TuuLOCK, THE LoOic OF LAW (1970).
1985]
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strain the political process. 9 Moreover, the Court concluded that
local governments should be subject to antitrust scrutiny because
of the danger of wealth-maximization even in a local government
setting. 0 If antitrust is to be confined to its proper sphere, courts
must analyze the practices of local governments as well. Local gov-
ernments must act to maximize the wealth of the residents of the
governed community, and their conduct should be condemned only
if these practices amount to an offense.
Almost every local government practice challenged under the
antitrust statutes, including the one analyzed in this article, was
used as an integral part of a complex sales transaction in which the
local government may have been the supplier, the purchaser, or
more likely, the agent for parties occupying one of those posi-
tions.2 Such practices are termed vertical restraints.2 Solely on
the basis of that observation, a judge reassessing local government
practices will be able to determine that the challenged practice was
intended to serve some instrumental function in effectuating the
transaction. Applying the wealth-maximization assumption, he will
then realize that, in most situations, the local government intended
that function either to secure the benefits that are the subject of
the transaction or to reduce the costs of making it. In a large num-
ber of cases it will be clear to the judge that without the challenged
practice the transaction would not have taken place because the
benefits would have appeared ephemeral or the costs prohibitive.
The judge will want to make more specific deductions on the basis
of more intricate observations about the function of the challenged
practice; however, with only his general deductions in hand the
judge will still be able to search for an antitrust principle inconsis-
tent with that function.
Whatever the principle may be, it must speak to the likely ef-
fects of the transaction, or to ones like it. Antitrust law is con-
cerned with the effects of economic activity. Nonetheless, some ac-
tivity is condemned under the so-called rule of per se illegality
19. 435 U.S. at 405 n.31, 416-17, quoted with approval in, Boulder, 455 U.S. at 57-58.
20. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 403-04, 412-13,
discussed with approval in Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 49-51
(1982).
21. Cf. Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 123 (7th Cir.
1982) (Action involving exclusive franchises for cable television).
22. Because this article focuses on vertical restraints, it adopts a transaction costs ap-
proach. For an illustration of transaction cost analysis, see Williamson, Assessing Vertical
Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 953, 975-80 (1979).
[Vol. 39:589
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without an elaborate inquiry into its actual anticompetitive effects,
because the effects are so likely to be undesirable that making the
inquiry would be wasteful.2 3 Because of the relationship between
the local government practice and the transaction itself, the only
effects that are of interest are those that arise out of the transac-
tion. These effects will be of two kinds: (1) those that relate to the
creation of wealth, which antitrust scholars usually call consumer
welfare, and (2) those that relate to the distribution of wealth, the
question of who gains and who loses. The creation of wealth is
commonly considered beneficial. When applying that principle, the
transaction that creates wealth would usually be considered desira-
ble. The parties to it will have perceived themselves as better off
for having entered into the transaction, unless a miscalculation has
been made.24 Otherwise, they would not have agreed to the ex-
change. The same observation may be made about parties to any
sales transaction. Thus, when viewed statically, such transactions
tend to create wealth.25 Viewed dynamically, they certainly do cre-
ate wealth. Producers and consumers tend to shift resources to
higher value uses by entering into these transactions. After making
the agreements, the total personal value the owners attach to the
exchanged goods and services tends to be larger than it was
before.26
Two possible exceptions to the general rule that sales transac-
tions create wealth merit discussion. First, certain sales transac-
tions may be, in large part, transfer payments. For example, a
transportation enterprise owned by a local government might sell
bus service to senior citizens at prices well below the marginal
costs of providing it. Local government might be making an inkind
transfer payment to those citizens. Aside from endowment effects
that are likely to be negligible, transfer payments themselves have
no impact on the creation of wealth. The method by which they
are financed, for example taxation in the case of governments,
23. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
24. Making miscalculations is likely to be a self-limiting activity and therefore an unim-
portant one in the aggregate. Because the market would adequately punish miscalculations,
and because the use of law to punish them would create risks likely to deter some efficient
behavior, we ignore the possibility of such miscalculations in antitrust analysis.
25. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION,
AND CONTROL 28-31 (2d ed. 1977).
26. Id. at 30-31.
27. Some of these transactions may involve the sale of a durable good, like a house,
subject to resale limitations. See Strauss & Stegman, Moderate-Cost Housing After Lafay-
ette: A Proposal, 11 URB. LAW. 209 (1979).
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would almost certainly have an impact by reducing incentives to
work or invest. Accordingly, in applying our principle that the cre-
ation of wealth is beneficial, transfer payments, while not necessa-
rily desirable, are certainly not objectionable.
The second exception consists of sales transactions that are
strategically designed to secure market power by restricting out-
put. For example, the transportation enterprise described in the
preceding paragraph could be selling its services to senior citizens
at low prices in order to drive competitors out of the market. Once
successful, the enterprise would attempt to raise its prices and ob
tain monopoly profits by reducing the supply of bus services in re-
sponse to the drop in demand. The public would find this type of
transaction highly objectionable.
It is unlikely that judges hearing an antitrust suit against a
local government would encounter transactions having monopolis-
tic effects. For reasons which have been discussed elsewhere, most
enterprises would not engage in such strategic behavior because
the expected losses from doing so would exceed the expected
gains.2 8 Even scholars who believe that such behavior will be exer-
cised often enough to raise serious antitrust concerns assume that
only dominant enterprises or those that are part of a collusive oli-
gopoly will be the culprits.29 It is particularly unlikely that local
governments would engage in such conduct. Local government
managers have little incentive to participate in strategic market
behavior in light of the considerable difficulties in capturing the
expected revenues derived from such behavior. Moreover, it would
be difficult to implement this type of strategy because local gov-
ernments tend to be plagued by greater turnover among top pol-
icy-makers and more cumbersome operating procedures than are
28. See R. BORK, supra note 12, at 144-60; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 184-96 (1976); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U.
CHI. L. REv. 263 (1981); Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust, 13 J.
LAW & EcON. 223 (1970); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1
J. LAW & ECON. 137 (1958).
29. E.g., Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE
L.J. 284 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Predatory Pricing]; Williamson, Predatory Pricing II,
88 YALE L.J. 1183 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Predatory Pricing II]. Williamson defines a
dominant firm as one having 60% of the relevant market, and asserts that collusive oligop-
oly is likely to occur "mainly in mature, highly concentrated industries producing homoge-
neous products under uniform cost conditions and having significant barriers to entry."
Predatory Pricing, supra note 29, at 293. He suggests that highly concentrated industries
are those in which four or fewer firms account for more than 70% of the output. Predatory
Pricing II, supra note 29, at 1194.
[Vol. 39:589
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private enterprises of similar size.30
In almost every case, therefore, the effects of the transaction
do not appear to be objectionable from a consumer welfare point of
view. These effects might be objectionable, if at all, only in terms
of wealth distribution. The judge will have to search for a control-
ling principle that will allow him to prefer one group to another.
As long as the plaintiff may plausibly argue that he belongs to the
disfavored group and the defendant to the favored, the judge may
loosely define both groups despite their being comprised of ever-
changing populations. After all, the principle must require that the
objecting party, the plaintiff, prevail upon proof of his claim.
Judges will encounter three serious problems in conducting
their search: (1) a problem of logic, (2) a problem of advocacy, and
(3) a problem of case analysis. Logistically, no matter what princi-
ple of preference the judge considers, he will find that it does not
require the plaintiff to prevail. The judge will have no difficulty
designating any number of groups to which the parties belong. Let
the plaintiff belong to group P and the defendant to group D. In
addition to the plaintiff and would-be parties, P presumably has
many members who would accede to the particular transaction by
virtue of a favorable disposition of the pending suit."1 The judge
would then consider the principle that it is good to prefer members
of group P to members of group D. He must determine whether
that principle requires the plaintiff to prevail upon proof of his
claim. The answer would be yes if penalizing the defendant for en-
tering into the transaction tends to make the members of P better
off than they otherwise are. The answer, however, is no; the reason
inheres in the dynamics of markets. 2 First, consider the impact of
penalizing the defendant from P's point of view. Members of that
group wishing to bind themselves by making promises similar to
those of the plaintiff would encounter a major obstacle. Everyone
would realize that if he entered into a transaction in which a mem-
ber of P made such a promise, he would then subject himself to the
risks of paying substantial litigation costs and suffering an adverse
antitrust judgment. The result is that members of P would not be
30. The approach described is, at least to this point, analogous to that which William-
son advocates. See Williamson, supra note 22, at 975-80.
31. Otherwise, the principle of wealth-distribution being tested would be a meaningless,
tautological trap in our system of jurisprudence-that the plaintiff should prevail in a given
dispute because he and those allied with him will be better off if he does.
32. For a brief overview of market dynamics, see A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS 107-10 (1983).
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able to obtain the value of that promise; indeed, they would forfeit
a "property right."
Now consider the impact of penalizing the defendant from D's
point of view. When contemplating a transaction, members of D
would take into account the prospect of penalties under the anti-
trust laws. They would freely expend resources to avoid that result.
Therefore, the transactions would be more costly than they other-
wise would have been, and members of D would tend to make
fewer or less valuable offers to members of P. In short, penalizing
the defendant for entering into the transaction would tend to make
members of P, although not the plaintiff, worse off.83
At this point the judge might wish to call off the search, but
he may not feel free to do so lest he be accused of casting aside
precedent and the many antitrust cases which seem to have been
resolved on the basis of some elusive principle of wealth distribu-
tion. 4 To continue his search for that principle, the judge would
have to ignore market dynamics. Such willful ignorance has been
aptly called sentimentality."
A sentimental judge is critical to the plaintiff's case. Yet, even
if he is, he will likely obtain little meaningful assistance from
plaintiff's counsel in conducting his search. Counsel will likely in-
sist that the court should decide the case based on whether the
challenged practice denied plaintiff the opportunity to do business,
eliminated the plaintiff as a rival, excluded the plaintiff from the
market, subjected the plaintiff to abuse, or limited the freedom of
the plaintiff to run his business independently. Characterizing the
inquiry obscures rather than reveals the alleged controlling princi-
ple of wealth-distribution. This is an advocacy problem. Counsel
will create this obscurity for two strategic reasons. First, he may
then rely on that loose Jeffersonian ideology that prevades so
many antitrust opinions." That ideology, which is so vague and yet
33. The illogic of applying a wealth distribution-principle to resolve antitrust disputes
makes for unpredictable outcomes. Unpredictable outcomes are evidence that the courts are
making policy decisions that traditionally belong to legislatures. Thus, they raise the ques-
tion of who governs. See R. BORK, supra note 12, at 418-25. That question is raised rather
starkly in those cases in which a local government is the defendant. See cases cited infra
note 40.
34. For a recent example of such a case, see Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0.
Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982).
35. See R. BORK, supra note 12, at 54-55; Will, As I Was Saying, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 16,
1979, at 100.
36. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCI-
PLES AND THEIR APPLICATION T 1096 (1980); R. BORK, supra note 12, at 54-56. See generally
1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 36, at § 103-12; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
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so appealing, is likely to receive a more sympathetic reception than
any particular wealth-distribution principle that might otherwise
be more appropriate. Second, he may be able to invoke antitrust
precedent that involves private enterprises engaged in arguably
similar practices. This is particularly true where the court charac-
terized the inquiry in the same way and condemned or found the
practice suspect.
Unfortunately, the judge will likely turn to those cases for
some help in conducting his search. He will probably find it diffi-
cult to distinguish the ideological rhetoric used in those opinions
from the wealth-distribution principle that, market dynamics
aside, dictated the result. This is the case analysis problem. Pa-
tient study will reveal that private holdings of wealth, usually re-
ferred to as firms, 7 that are "smaller" or "less advantaged", are
preferable to firms that are "larger" or "more advantaged." The
judge will have been searching for this principle. It reflects a crude
theory of public choice, and of that collection of sentiments and
beliefs known as populism. 8 This theory explains political behav-
ior largely on the basis of the relative wealth of the private antago-
nists interested in influencing the behavior. Populism holds that
behavior will be better the wider and more even the distribution of
wealth."'
Having finally completed his search, the judge will find that
his efforts were in vain. Neither the principle discovered, nor the
public choice theory and the ideology that it reflects, will suggest
that the judge rule against the defendant local government. The
principle does not even speak to whether the court should prefer
private holdings of wealth to either public or collective holdings,
POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 17-18 (1959).
37. This reference is permissible for casual discussion. It does not, however, reflect re-
cent advances in the theory of the firm. See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Informa-
tion Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMiCA 386 (1937). Furthermore, for the purposes of sophisticated analy-
sis, this reference may be misleading, particularly when too much is made of the corporate
legal form which many "firms" take.
38. Analyst Bork refers to them as a "jumble of half-digested notions and mythologies."
R. BORK, supra note 12, at 54. They usually include a professed concern for the. "free
choice" of the "independent" businessman and his "opportunity to do business" (what ana-
lyst Bork calls the bondage theme), a stated preference for atomistic markets ("fragmenta-
tion for its own sake"), and a devotion to "fairness," which usually means equality of out-
comes. Id. at 50-56.
39. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 36, at 1096; R. BORK, supra note 12, at
54-55. Some leading antitrust opinions reflect both this theory and ideology. See, e.g.,
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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like those of local governments. The theory has little, if anything,
to do with political behavior related to disputes between private
enterprises and local government. Moreover, populism does not
suggest that the situation would be better if private enterprise
were made wealthier at the expense of local government. Indeed,
populism, as it is commonly understood, probably dictates that the
courts prefer local government, together with the taxpayers it pur-
ports to represent, to any firm. Local government is populist-pre-
ferred; thus, any objection to the wealth-distribution effects of the
transaction would not be well taken. Because there is no principle
according to which the judge might consider the effects of the
transaction undesirable, he will be bound to reject the plaintiff's
attack on the challenged practice.
III. THE PROCESS ILLUSTRATED
Every local government enters into agreements with suppliers,
and occasionally purchasers, pursuant to which they decline to buy
from, or sell to, some or all of their rivals. Of course, this practice
displeases rivals who too frequently claim that it runs afoul of the
Sherman Act. It has probably been the focus of more antitrust liti-
gation against local government than any other practice. 0 These
40. E.g., Catalina Cablevision Assocs. v. City of Tucson, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
66,249 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 1984); Daley v. Town of New Durham, 733 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1984);
Tom Hudson & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Chula Vista, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,251 (9th
Cir. Oct. 25, 1984); Springs Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. City of Rancho Mirage, 1983-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,646 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 1983), granting preliminary injunction pending
trial in 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,014 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 1984), rev'd in part, 1984-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 66,261 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 1984); Englert v. City of McKeesport, 564 F.
Supp. 375 (W.D. Penn. 1983), rev'd, 736 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1984); Central Iowa Refuse Sys.,
Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency, 557 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Iowa
1982), aff'd, 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985); Omega Satel-
lite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982); All Am. Cab Co. v.
Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Auth., 547 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Tenn. 1982), aff'd mem., 723
F.2d 908 (6th Cir. 1982); Glenwillow Landfill, Inc. v. City of Akron, 485 F. Supp. 671 (N.D.
Ohio 1979), aff'd sub nom. Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir.
1981), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982) (for consideration in light of Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder), remanded mem., 701 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), on re-
mand, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 65,356 (N.D. Ohio April 6, 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 949 (6th
Cir. 1984); Shrader v. Horton, 471 F. Supp. 1236 (W.D. Va. 1979), afJ'd, 626 F.2d 1163 (4th
Cir. 1980); Alpin v. Henson, 392 F. Supp. 813 (D. Md. 1975), affd, 538 F.2d 85 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976), amended, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258
(6th Cir. 1974); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Mercy-Peninsula Ambulance, Inc. v. County of
San Mateo, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 66,264 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 1984); Midway Airlines,
Inc. v. County of Westchester, 584 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Mays v. Hosp. Auth., 582
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unhappy rivals refer to this practice with various labels. "Refusal
to deal" and "exclusive dealing" arrangments are favorites, along
with a related catch-all phrase, "boycott."'" Where the agreement
is with a supplier, the rivals may also claim that the practice cre-
ates a monopoly in the market consisting of the local government's
purchases. This arrangement between local government and its
suppliers is used in countless situations, but it serves a limited
number of functions. Some of those functions are best illustrated
by garden-variety uses, and others by more striking ones.
A. Deducing Functions
Consider first a garden-variety use, the one that was attacked
in Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Services, Inc.42 In North
Carolina, the Moore County Board of Commissioners had made ar-
rangements with Resort Air Services for Resort to serve as a fixed
base operator at the county's Southern Pines Airport. All fixed
based operators sell aviation fuel, lubricants, and aircraft mainte-
nance and storage. Some of them sell and rent aircraft, charter
flights, and offer flying lessons.43 The Board apparently leased a
portion of the airport to Resort, and Resort promised to sell a
number of products and services to airport patrons." Having made
those arrangements, the Board allegedly refused to make similar
ones with Pinehurst Airlines, a would-be rival of Resort.45 That re-
F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Campbell v. City of Chicago, 577 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 556 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.
Ohio 1983); Jonnet Dev. v. Caliguiri, 558 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Penn. 1983); Hopkinsville
Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1982); Crocker
v. Padnos, 483 F. Supp. 229 (D. Mass. 1980); Tulsa County Pub. Health Nursing Serv., Inc.
v. Tulsa City-Co. Health Dep't, 475 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Okla. 1979); Continental Bus Sys.,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Azzaro v. Town of Branford, 1974-
2 Trade Cas (CCH) 1 75,337 (D. Conn. Nov. 4, 1974); Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361
F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
41. "Boycott" could be substituted for almost any other label commonly affixed to al-
leged antitrust offenses. See R. POSNER, ANTrIRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 207-11
(1976).
42. 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
43. Id. at 548 & n.1.
44. Id. at 547-48 & n.1.
45. Id. at 555 & n.19. The opinion does not reveal whether Pinehurst alleged that the
Board refused to make such an arrangement pursuant to an explicit agreement. See id. at
549 & n.4. Pinehurst may have merely alleged that the Board and Resort perceived that the
Southern Pines Airport had limited facilities suitable for a fixed based operator, and that
the construction of new ones would be expensive. Believing that the other party shared
those perceptions, Pinehurst may have understood that the Board would refuse to make
arrangements for FBO service with any enterprise other than Resort. Legally, little, if any-
thing, turned on which allegation Pinehurst had made-functionally, nothing turned on it.
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fusal prevented Pinehurst from serving as a fixed based operator
de jure. Pinehurst, however, was already a user of airport facilities
and structures, so it could easily have sold to airport patrons some
of the products or services sold by Resort. To prevent Pinehurst
from serving as a fixed based operator de facto, the Board allegedly
took the additional step of denying a request for maintenance
space, thereby making it prohibitively costly for Pinehurst to
operate.'O
Pinehurst claimed, inter alia, that the Board's course of con-
duct, a garden-variety use of the practice analyzed here, ran afoul
of Section one and Section two of the Sherman Act. The Board
and Resort allegedly conspired to prevent Pinehurst from compet-
ing in the market for the services of fixed based operators at the
Southern Pines Airport' 7 and to monopolize that market.'8 Pine-
hurst could have invoked other antitrust labels, such as "mono-
polizing" or "attempting to monopolize" the market,'" "boycott-
ing,"50 and "conspiring to exclude" 5' Pinehurst from the market.
46. Id. at 555 & nn.19-20. Pinehurst also alleged that the Board denied it a fuel facility
to serve aircraft other than that of Pinehurst and that it treated Pinehurst differently from
Resort with regard to improvement generally. Moreover, Pinehurst claimed that the Board
made deceptive and false representations about it to the F.A.A., levied "inflated" electricity
charges, required it to file financial statements, and helped Resort harrass it. Finally, pre-
sumably to add insult to injury, Pinehurst asserted that the Board insisted that it deal with
the airport through Resort. Id.
47. Id. at 550-55.
48. Id. Resort's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted was grounded, in part, on what it argued was Pinehurst's failure to allege the rele-
vant geographic and product markets. Id. at 551. The court rejected that argument, observ-
ing that Pinehurst did allege that (1) "the Airport is the only one in Moore County that is
federally funded and equipped to service passenger air service for the Southern Pines resort
community," and that (2) "Resort enjoys the position as the sole FBO at the airport." Id.
Apparently, the first observation suggested to the court that the airport was the geographic
market; the second one implied that the alleged product market was the one for all goods
"required and used by customers of the airport FBO." Id. On that "analysis," almost every
exclusive franchise at a major public facility would'constitute a monopoly.
49. For cases so labelling the practice, see E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Pueblo Aircraft Serv.
Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 498 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Col. 1980), aff'd, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 762 (1983); Alphin v. Henson, 392 F. Supp. 813 (D. Md. 1975),
aff'd, 538 F.2d 85 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976), amended, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F.
Supp. 350 (W.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975); Murdock v. City of Jackson-
ville, 361 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
50. For cases so labelling the same practice, see Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.
1981); Metro Cable Co v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350 (W.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd,
516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
51. For cases so labelling the same practice, see Pueblo, 498 F. Supp. 1205; Guthrie v.
Genesee County, 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of
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All labels describe, albeit incompletely, the Board's course of con-
duct. In addition, because of the misleadingly pejorative language,
none of the labels reveal the true objection to the Board's course of
conduct.
The court never ascertained the true objection. If the court
had properly analyzed the issues raised by the motions that were
pending before it, there would be no need to ascertain the true
objection because none of those issues bore on the merits of Pine-
hurst's claim.5 2 Unfortunately, the court analyzed one of them, the
governmental exemption issue, as if there were a need.5 - The issue
was whether the Board's alleged course of conduct could be scruti-
nized under the federal antitrust statutes.
Apparently,54  the court reasoned that because the alleged
course of conduct was "anticompetitive," the North Carolina leg-
islature must not have authorized the conduct when it empow-
ered" counties to establish and operate airports, and to lease por-
Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated and remanded, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th
Cir. 1981).
52. Both the private and governmental defendants moved for dismissal pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) & (6). These motions raised issues relating to
standing, exhaustion of remedies, primary jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction (nexus to
interstate commerce), statute of limitations, and market definition, as well as state action
"immunity."
53. 476 F. Supp. 543, 551-56 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
54. The court's unfocused discussion of the "governmental exemption" issue permits
only a qualified statement of the court's reasoning. Moreover, particularly confusing is the
court's much ado about the North Carolina statute empowering local governments "to de-
termine. . . the terms and conditions under which. . . properties [which they control] may
be used, provided that in all cases the public is not deprived of its rightful, equal, and
uniform use of such property." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-53(5) (1975). The court stated that this
statute showed that the North Carolina Legislature had not contemplated the challenged
practice because that practice prevented the public from equal and uniform use. 476 F,
Supp. at 554-55. But the court must not have meant what it said, for the practice only
limited equal and uniform use by would-be airport concessionaires.
55. 476 F. Supp. at 551, 553. What the court meant by "anticompetitive" is not clear.
"'Competition' may be read as [1] the process of rivalry; ...[2] the absence of restraint
over one person's or firm's economic activities by any other person or firm; . .. [3] that
state of the market 'in which the individual buyer or seller does not influence the price by
his purchases or sales'; ... [4] the existence of 'fragmented industries and markets' pre-
served 'through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses'; or. . .[5] a term
of art, designating any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by
moving to an alternative state of affairs through judicial decree." R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 58-61 (1978). For the reasons suggested by analyst
Bork, only the latter is suitable for the purposes of antitrust law. If, however, the court
meant that the transaction between the Board and Resort decreased consumer welfare, then
it was mistaken.
56. The North Carolina statute empowers a local government "[t]o determine the
charge or rental for the use of any properties under its control ... and the terms and
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tions of them in connection with those activities.5 7 Therefore,
applying Lafayette, the court concluded that the Board's actions
were subject to scrutiny under the federal antitrust statutes.
The conclusion may have been correct, but the analysis was
flawed. The court ignored the Supreme Court's cautionary lan-
guage in Lafayette about inferring state authorization and direc-
tion."8 More importantly, it confused legality with immunity."
Nevertheless, the court should have ascertained the true objection
to the Board's course of conduct before pronouncing it
anticompetitive.60
To determine the true objection, the court would have had to
first ascertain the function that the Board's course of conduct, the
"practice," was supposed to serve. Careful observation of the eco-
nomic context in which the Board used the practice would have
revealed that it was part of a transaction whereby the Board pur-
chased a service from Resort. That may seem counter-intuitive be-
cause the transaction did not require the Board to transfer money
to Resort, whereas under the lease, Resort did transfer money to
conditions under which such properties may be used ...." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-53(5)
(1981). Those "charges," the statute provides, "shall be ... established with due regard to
the property and improvements used and the expense of operation to the municipality." Id.
It could be argued that § 63-53(5) directs local governments to try to capture as cost-effec-
tively as possible the quasi-rents generated by properties they control, which is what the
Moore County Board was apparently doing.
57. Cf. Guthrie, 494 F. Supp. 950. Guthrie complained, inter alia, that the county had
violated the antitrust laws by (1) making arrangements with Prior Aviation Service to re-
place Guthrie's Batavia Aviation as the fixed base operator at the county's airport and then
refusing to make similar arrangements with him, and (2) taking additional steps in concert
with Prior, who also served as the airport manager, to make sure that Batavia could not
continue to use the airport to sell any products or services to airport patrons commonly sold
by fixed base operators. The county moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. One of the grounds for its motion was "that the
Sherman Act does not apply to conduct undertaken by a local government ... pursuant to
state legislation which authorizes a restriction of competition." Id. at 953. In fact, New York
law expressly provides for the exclusive lease of portions of airports for the availability of
various services. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 352(5) (Consol. 1982). Nevertheless, the court denied
the motion on the same analysis employed by the Pinehurst court.
58. The Court opined that it would infer state authorization or direction when it found
"from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the
legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of." 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1975) (quot-
ing the decision of the court of appeals, 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
59. Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" after Lafayette, 95 HARv. L. REv.
435 (1981).
60. The opinion contains the assertion that "[tihe-[clourt expresses no opinion as to
whether any antitrust violation has occurred. . . ." but that assertion is belied by the key
role played by the "anticompetitive" label in the court's reasoning as well as the tenor of the
opinion. 476 F. Supp. at 555.
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the Board. An explanation may be necessary.
The Board managed an airport on behalf of the taxpayers of
Moore County, the "owners."61 Presumably, the Board, like the
management of any private enterprise took actions calculated to
maximize the value to the airport.62 In this context, "value of the
airport" means the expected value, discounted to its present value,
of the stream of income which the Board could use the airport to
generate. Apparently, the Board believed that the value of the air-
port would. be increased if it arranged to use some of the facilities
and personnel at the airport to meet the demand of patrons for
products and services which are typically sold at other airports by
fixed base operators (FBO). Meeting that demand is itself a service
which, for lack of a better name, shall be called FBO service.
The Board could have arranged for FBO service either hierar-
chically, by directing one or more of its employees to provide it, or
across a market, by entering into a contract.63 Regardless of which
method the Board chose, it would have had to pay for FBO service.
Had the arrangements been hierarchical, it would have been obvi-
ous that the Board was paying. Its employees would have been
selling products and services to airport patrons, and they would
have looked to the Board for their wages.6 4 Under the more com-
plex arrangements that the Board actually made, which were
across a market, the Board's payment for the services was not so
obvious. In fact, it might seem that the Board cleverly obtained
FBO services for free. The Board probably did obtain services for
less than it would have paid had the arrangements been hierarchi-
cal. On the basis of our wealth-maximizing assumption, we may
presume that the Board arranged for services across a market be-
61. Identifying the taxpayers as the owners and the local government as their agent is
consistent with the mandated assumption that local governments act to maximize the
wealth of those they represent. Of course, as individuals, the taxpayers held rather limited
rights in the airport, to say the least. For example, if a taxpayer wished to divest himself of
his "interest" in the airport, he would have had to leave Moore County. Nevertheless, as a
group, the taxpayers possessed the usual incidents of ownership. They even have the collec-
tive right to any residual income generated by the operation of the airport whose value they
could capture via a reduced tax assessment.
62. Recall the mandated assumption that local governments act to maximize the wealth
of the residents of the governed community.
63. The distinction between the two is not nearly so stark as the text may imply. In
fact, they merely identify two ends of a continuum. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIER-
ARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW & EcON. 297 (1978).
64. Wages reflect only the most obvious costs that the Board would have had to pay.
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cause it believed that it would be cheaper to do so. 5 Nonetheless,
the Board did pay. When the Board entered into the contract with
Resort, it gave up the opportunity to earn a stream of income from
sales that could have been made by its employees. Such opportuni-
ties are frequently called concessions or franchises. That conces-
sion was worth quite a bit of money, probably just a bit less than
the present value of Resort's expected net revenues. The Board
transferred it to Resort in return for FBO services.
The lease, pursuant to which Resort transferred money to the
Board, can now be seen in proper perspective. The lease itself was
really incidental to a more complex transaction, pursuant to which
the Board transferred a concession to Resort. Thus, while it is true
that Resort rented a portion of the airport which the Board con-
trolled, it is equally true, and far more significant in terms of value
as well as antitrust law, that the Board rented some of the equip-
ment and personnel which Resort controlled. When the Board en-
gaged in the practice challenged by Pinehurst, it was purchasing
FBO service from Resort. That was the economic reality which the
court apparently failed to grasp.
Had the court understood the economic realities, it would
have had grave doubts about the validity of Pinehurst's complaint
since it would have been painfully obvious that the Board had no
discernible interest in restricting the output of FBO service. It is
unlikely that the Board entered into the transaction with Resort
for the purpose of making a transfer payment. Fixed based opera-
tors are probably too successful to qualify for charity and too weak
to command subsidies. It is even less likely that the Board entered
into it for strategic purposes. The airport probably had neither ex-
isting rivals to drive from the market nor any potential rivals to
keep out. Even if it had, it is difficult to see how the Board's ar-
rangements with Resort could have effectuated either goal. Given
the relatively large number of would-be fixed base operators and
the relatively small start-up costs of becoming one, those arrange-
ments probably would have had no effect on the ability of an ex-
isting or potential rival airport to obtain FBO service. 6 As an ordi-
65. That belief may have occurred because, pursuant to the contract, Resort would
have the same incentives to provide fbo service that the Board had, thus obviating the need
for expensive monitoring. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
66. It is also rather unlikely that Resort was engaged in a strategic maneuver not only
because of the reasons stated in the text but also because the Board probably would have
captured all of the expected monopoly revenues in the form of "rent."
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nary purchaser, of course, the Board would have been interested in
expanding output. The grave doubts engendered by these observa-
tions might have prompted the court to systematically study the
functions that the challenged practice was supposed to serve.
The Board's refusal to make arrangements with Pinehurst for
FBO service was likely aimed at serving an instrumental function
in the complex sales transaction between it and Resort." Gener-
ally, that function was to help secure the transaction's benefits, or
otherwise reduce the costs associated with the transaction. The
question is, how could the Board's refusal produce those results?
There are two ways the Board could have benefited by promis-
ing to make arrangements with Pinehurst. First, their action might
have created the most efficient way of providing that service. Re-
call the presumption that the Board acts in a manner calculated to
maximize the value of the airport. Necessarily, then, the Board
would permit the use of airport-connected resources to provide
FBO service only up to the point that they added more to the
value of the airport than they would add if put to some other use.
With those limited resources, it is plausible that FBO service could
be most efficiently provided, all else being equal, by a single opera-
tor. That "natural monopoly" might reflect scale economies in
"producing" the service. It might, however, also reflect economies
either in coordinating the delivery of the service with other air-
port-related activities, like departures and arrivals, or in adapting
that delivery to major changes promoted by significant mainte-
nance projects or structural modifications." The Board's promise
would have assured the chosen operator of the opportunity to pro-
vide efficient service throughout the entire term of the agreement.
That assurance would have raised the expected value of the opera-
tor's net revenues and, thereby, the actual value of that portion of
the airport which the operator was to lease. Thus, the Board could
have obtained more "rent." Of much greater significance, the
Board could have also obtained more revenues from airport pa-
trons. If the FBO service was provided efficiently, the service
would make its maximum possible contribution to the value of the
67. Of course, the Board may have refused to make arrangements with Pinehurst be-
cause one of the members of the Board wanted to do a favor for his friend, a principal
shareholder of Resort, but that is not what is important for the purposes of antitrust
analysis.
68. These planning economies provide one of the principal inducements for entering
into requirements contracts, of which the arrangements between Board and Resort is but
one example. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
airport. By promising to make arrangements with Pinehurst, the
Board, entering into the transaction, achieved its goal.
The second way of effectuating a gain is related not to effi-
ciency in providing the service, but in arranging for it. By making
its promise to Pinehurst, the Board could have avoided substantial
transaction costs. These costs are among the things least likely to
be equal. Obviously, the Board bore fewer negotiating costs by en-
tering into only one transaction rather than two or more. 9 Less
obviously, but more importantly, the Board may have borne lower
monitoring costs than it otherwise would have.7 Monitoring, along
with contract enforcement, is required to limit opportu-
nism-"making false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved threats or
promises, ' '71 and "cutting corners for undisclosed personal advan-
tage, covering up tracks, and the like."'7 2 Limiting opportunism,
that is controlling cheating, is the key to "the viability of a pattern
of exchange. '73 That is not to say that all economic actors, or even
all fixed based operators, would cheat. But some would, and it is
expensive to sort out the cheaters and the noncheaters. 4 Monitor-
ing a fixed based operator by conventional methods, with inspec-
tion, may have appeared ineffectual or, if effectual, expensive. The
Board may have believed that it would be more cost-effective to
induce satisfactory performance by permitting the operator to earn
returns which would be put at risk, like a hostage, if the operator
acted opportunistically. 5
The Board could have also used its promise to help capture
some of the quasi-rents generated by the investment in the airport.
A "quasi-rent [is] [a]ny payment that does not affect the amount
69. The Board might have found itself bearing additional negotiating costs in the fu-
ture if it decided to replace the single provider. There is no reason to believe, however, that
the Board would make the decision to replace any more often if it had a single provider
than if it had several providers.
70. "'Monitoring' connotes several activities in addition to its disciplinary connotation.
It connotes measuring output performance, apportioning awards, observing the output be-
havior of inputs as a means of detecting or estimating their marginal productivity, and giv-
ing assignments or instructions in what to do and how to do it. (It also includes. . . author-
ity to terminate or revise contracts.)". Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 65, at 783 (monitoring
and the importance of monitoring costs in determining economic organization is the central
focus of this article).
71. E. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION 105 (1969).
72. Williamson, supra note 22, at 957.
73. Hirshleifer, Economics from a Biological Standpoint, 20 J. LAW & ECoN. 1, 27
(1977).
74. Williamson, supra note 22, at 957.
75. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 63, at 303-07.
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[of a good] currently available but will affect the future amount. ''" 7
Specialized capital assets are prime generators of quasi-rents. By
making its promise, the Board eliminated the possibility of any
competition for airport patrons among fixed base operators at the
Southern Pines Airport. By eliminating that possibility, the Board
created an opportunity, albeit an evanescent one, for the chosen
operator to appropriate some of those quasi-rents. Would-be oper-
ators could be expected to compete for that opportunity. They
would do so by offering lump-sum or installment payments which
might take the form of a franchise, or a license fee, or additional
"rent.' '7 It would be reasonable to expect that in the process of
competing, at least one of the operators would be driven to offer a
payment almost as great in value as the quasi-rents which they
had hoped to appropriate.7 8 The Board could accept such an offer
and thereby capture those quasi-rents, or at least most of them, for
itself and its constituent taxpayers. This may appear to be yet a
third way for the Board to gain by making its promise, but this
appearance is deceiving. The Board's gain would stem from the
avoidance of substantial transaction costs. The Board could cap-
ture some of the quasi-rents as long as it contractually prevented
unlimited competition between operators for the patronage of air-
port customers. A variety of stratagems would do that, but making
the promise the Board allegedly made was likely the most cost-
effective one.
To summarize, the challenged practice was probably supposed
to serve one or both of two basic instrumental functions. First, it
might have helped secure efficient FBO service. Second, it might
have helped reduce the costs of negotiating and, especially, moni-
toring and enforcing arrangements for that service.7 9 It also per-
mitted the capturing of some quasi-rents generated by the taxpay-
ers' investment in portions of the airport used in providing that
service.
A similar explanation could apply in most instances in which a
local government enters into an agreement with suppliers, or pur-
76. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION,
AND CONTROL 99 (2d ed. 1977). Quasi-rents are closely related to economic rents which are
"market receipts that affect neither the present nor the future amount of that good." Id.
For an excellent analysis of quasi-rents as a determinant of economic organization, see
Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 63.
77. Here I use the word in its lay rather than in its technical sense. Sometimes, but not
always, "rent" payments reflect quasi-rents.
78. See generally Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J. LAW & ECON. 55 (1968).
79. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 76, at 110.
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chasers, pursuant to which it declines to buy from, or sell to, some
or all of their rivals. That practice, of which the Board apparently
made garden-variety use, is usually employed to serve the same
kind of functions as those which were supposedly served by the
Board's alleged promise.8 Indeed, it is often supposed to serve
those functions even when put to more striking use, as when the
cities of Dallas and Fort Worth used it in arranging for taxicab
service at the Dallas/Fort Worth (D/FW) Regional Airport, the fo-
cus of the controversy in Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc.1
In the 1960's and early 1970's the cities of Dallas and Fort
Worth had the Texas-sized, multiterminal D/FW Regional Airport
(Airport) built in a relatively undeveloped area between the two
cities. They created an Airport Board to manage it, and they also
created the D/FW Surtran System (System), a joint venture
charged with the responsibility of ensuring that an adequate
ground transportation network served the Airport. The network
was to include an inter-terminal shuttle, one or more modes of
mass transportation, and most importantly, for this discussion,
taxicab service.
The System discharged that responsibility, in part, by auction-
ing off the exclusive right to pick up passengers and transport
them from the Airport to all points in the ten surrounding coun-
ties. The Airport Board decided to make this right exclusive. The
cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, and two smaller cities in which
portions of the Airport are located, enacted similar ordinances of
exclusivity.8 2 The ordinance barred anyone who had not obtained a
permit issued by the Airport Board from offering for-hire ground
transportation from the Airport. The Board decided to issue a per-
mit for taxicab service only to the winner of the System's auction.
It is unclear from the court's opinion whether the city enacted the
ordinance and the Board made its decision prior to the auction,
but it cannot be seriously doubted that the Board induced the par-
80. For examples of when it probably did so when local government defendants used it,
see Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Pueblo Aircraft
Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 498 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1980), aff'd, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1126 (1983); Guthrie v. Genessee County, 494 F. Supp. 950
(W.D.N.Y. 1980); Alpin v. Henson, 392 F. Supp. 813 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 85 (4th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976), amended, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350
(W.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975); Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F.
Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
81. 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
82. The cities are Irving and Grapevine, Texas.
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ticipants in the auction to prepare their bids on the basis that the
winner would obtain an exclusive right.
The winner was Surtran Taxicabs, Inc. (Surtran), a joint ven-
ture of Yellow Cab of Dallas, Inc., and Fort Worth Cab and Bag-
gage. Surtran offered to pay the System seventy-five cents per trip
and fifty percent of all "profits" in excess of a five percent "operat-
ing profit."8 It may have also offered to pay an additional lump-
sum fee for the permit, but the court's opinion does not reveal
whether it did or not. Pursuant to the contract that the parties
signed following the auction, Surtran agreed to supply, at set rates,
something akin to the taxicab service requirements of arriving pas-
sengers at the Airport, and to pay the System in accordance with
the terms of its bid.
These arrangements were the source of considerable unhappi-
ness among some licensed taxicab operators in the ten counties
surrounding the Airport. Dallas and Fort Worth refused to let
those operators pick up passengers at the Airport. Several of those
operators, including John Woolen, filed a class action suit challeng-
ing that refusal as violative of sections one and two of the Sherman
Act.8 4 The cities moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, which should have, but
did not, prompt the court to determine the true objection to the
cities' practice.85
83. 461 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (N.D. Tex. 1978). "Profit" has so many meanings that it is
not clear from the court's opinion precisely how the word was used in the agreement be-
tween the System and Surtran. "Operating profit" is, if anything, more nebulous.
84. The opinion does not reveal what labels, if any, plaintiff's counsel tried to affix to
the practice. Perhaps that is because, mercifully, the court did not completely succumb to
the allure of literalistic jurisprudence-resolving disputes largely on the basis of whether
plaintiff's counsel "proves," necessarily by analogy, that some pejorative label "fits" a prac-
tice. For a more extended description and analysis of this type of judicial decision-making,
see articles analyzing the opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit: Lee, Antitrust: Market Definition, The Section Two Offenses and Literalism, 57
CHL[-]KENT L. REV. 25 (1981); Lee, Antitrust: A Collage of Vertical Territorial Restraints,
Tying and Monopoly "Misuse," Arbitrability, and the General Dynamics Defense, 55 CHI.[-
]KENT L. REV. 1 (1979); Lee, Economic Regulation of Business: The Seventh Circuit's Non-
Economic Approach, 56 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 205 (1980). It did, however, make some related
errors. See infra text accompanying note 86.
85. In support of their motion, the cities pressed two arguments. The first was that the
practice was immune under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The court responded with
the same mistaken analysis employed by the Pinehurst court. Woolen, 461 F. Supp. at 1028.
The court reasoned that since the Texas legislature had not contemplated such an "anti-
competitive" practice, it was subject to scrutiny under the antitrust statutes. 461 F. Supp.
1025, 1028-33 (N.D. Tex. 1978). The cities' second argument, at least as the court appar-
ently understood it, was that the practice was per se legal. Id. at 1033. The cities asserted
that, as owners of the Airport, they could exclude any commercial enterprise from airport
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Had the court done so, it could have begun its analysis by ob-
serving that the cities used this practice in the context of purchas-
ing a service. To them, the service was meeting the taxicab trans-
portation requirements of arriving passengers at the Airport. The
cities could have arranged for that service by using one of two ba-
sic methods. They could have purchased vehicles, hired drivers,
and then directed that the System provide the service hierarchi-
property without committing an antitrust offense. Id. at 1036. Therefore, the plaintiffs were
not entitled to any relief under the Sherman Act. Id. at 1033.
The court's response to this second argument was two-pronged. The first prong con-
sisted of a line of analogical reasoning which, in the final analysis, begged the question. It
might be unlawful, began the court, for a monopolist, even one who had acquired his market
power lawfully, to agree to sell his products exclusively to one distributor. Id. at 1037-38.
For the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the challenged practice was to be treated as
analogous to such an agreement. Id. at 1039. The cities, taken together, were to be treated
as a monopolist. After all, "ownership of land," stated the court, "may because of its unique
location or other property attributes give to the landowner a specie of natural monop-
oly. ... Id. at 1037, meaning, presumably, the opportunity to obtain quasi-rents. Denying
entry to such land to all but one vendor of a particular kind of service could have the same
effect as a monopolist's exclusive distribution agreement. Id. Therefore, the court concluded,
the cities' refusal to let those taxicab operators unaffiliated with Surtran pick up passengers
at the Airport might be unlawful. Id. at 1040.
The analogy is surprisingly apt. The court did not explain, however, why a court should
ever consider a monopolist's exclusive dealing agreement unlawful. In fact, such an agree-
ment would be objectionable on consumer welfare grounds only if the monopolist entered
into it strategically for the purpose of disrupting the optimal distribution patterns of poten-
tial rivals. See Williamson, supra note 22, at 952, 960-66. Such behavior could not possibly
be successful unless the dealers' activities required investments in rather specialized assets.
Id. at 964. Only under such circumstances, if at all, would it likely be observed. Of course,
the court may be forgiven for its omission because it may have reasonably believed that no
explanation was necessary in the light of then existing authority. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRusT 429-31 (1977) (citing cases). Nevertheless, it is that
omission which obscures the flaw in the court's line of reasoning. To provide the missing
explanation, the court would have had to engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) what functions
are likely served by a monopolist's exclusive distribution agreement? and (2) according to
what principles might those functions be deemed objectionable? That is substantially the
same inquiry as the one the court should have made in order to determine whether the
cities' practice was per se legal. Thus, the first prong of the court's response was begging the
question.
The second prong was no more than a non sequitur. The cities' property rights, stated
the court, had to give way to the policy of the Sherman Act, particularly when those rights
had been "diluted" by the dedication of the airport for public purposes. 461 F. Supp. 1025,
1038 (N.D. Tex. 1978). It is not at all clear why property rights would ever have to give way
to the policy of the Sherman Act unless that policy were one calling for wealth redistribu-
tion. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1960). Even
assuming that it is clear how the court is to balance property rights and the policy of the
Sherman Act, the relevance of dedication to public purposes is not. The court's discussion of
airport solicitation cases is inapposite. That statement is simply beside the point of the
cities' argument, which was, in essence, that the way in which they exercised their property
rights was necessarily consistent with that policy. Thus, the court, in effect, substituted two
logical fallacies for an inquiry into the function of the challenged practice.-
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cally. Alternatively, they could have arranged for the service across
the market in a myriad of ways. For example, they could have per-
mitted unrestricted use of airport roads, and then relied on self-
interested taxicab operators for the service. As another option, the
cities could have purchased the service pursuant to a more well
defined contract.86 Obviously, they chose to do the latter, presuma-
bly because it was more cost-effective. An instrumental part of this
sales transaction was the cities' promise to make arrangements for
taxicab transportation from the Airport with only one company.
It might appear that the cities, in making such a promise,
could not secure efficient taxicab transportation. After all, at most
large airports, taxicab operators affiliated with several companies
solicit business. That would not be the case if a single company
could provide taxicab transportation more efficiently. That as-
sumption, however, could well be incorrect. A sole supplier of air-
port taxicab transportation might have an advantage over several
competing companies because of reduced congestion problems.
Suppose that airport congestion is such that, all else being equal, a
reduction in the supply of taxicab transportation would be effi-
cient. One would expect a sole supplier to make that reduction
since he would reap most of the benefits. Despite bearing most of
the operating costs, there is the expectation that the benefits
would exceed those costs. One would not necessarily expect several
suppliers, acting independently, to do the same. Each one would
fear the prospect of bearing the costs of such a reduction while
reaping none, or a small fraction, of the benefits. Coordinated ac-
tion might solve the problem, but the cost of arranging and moni-
toring such action might be prohibitive. If this advantage were
quantitatively significant, a sole supplier might be able to provide
airport taxicab service more efficiently than several suppliers. To
exploit this advantage, however, a taxicab company would have to
secure the exclusive right to pick up passengers at the airport. The
cost of securing that right might be prohibitive. If the supplier
purchased the rights from other taxicab companies, enforcement
costs might well be substantial. Moreover, such purchases would
likely spur the strategic entry of other companies anticipating a
buy out.8 7 Thus, even though a single company might provide taxi-
86. Permitting unrestricted use of airport roads and then relying on self-interested taxi-
cab operators for the desired service may be characterized as a less well defined contract
pursuant to which unrestricted use is exchanged for the service.
87. If the rights had been purchased from an airport board which had in the past per-
mitted unrestricted use, then realignment costs might have been larger. See Demsetz, Some
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cab transportation more efficiently than several companies, the
fact remains that taxicab operators affiliated with several compa-
nies solicit business at most large airports. The result is that by
promising to make arrangements for taxicab transportation from
the Airport with only one company, Dallas and Fort Worth may
have helped secure the delivery of that service more efficiently.
It is even more likely that by promising exclusivity Dallas and
Fort Worth helped reduce the costs of negotiating, and especially
monitoring, the taxicab service. Had they made arrangements with
several companies, they would have had to negotiate not only more
than one contract, but also, the potentially delicate interrelation-
ships existing among the operators of those companies."' Perhaps
more importantly, to ensure satisfactory performance under the
contracts, the cities might have had to engage in disproportion-
ately more monitoring, like data gathering, supervision, and other
relatively expensive activities, than they would have had otherwise
had they made arrangements with but one provider. This is partic-
ularly true when the provider fears the losing of returns to exclu-
sivity. This fear often induces satisfactory performance.
It is highly likely that by promising to make arrangements
with only one company, the cities helped to reduce the costs of
capturing some of the quasi-rents generated by the taxpayer's in-
vestment in the Airport. By so promising, the cities practically as-
sured themselves that the System's auction for the right to pick up
passengers would elicit offers to make payments equal in value to
those quasi-rents. Under the circumstances, one would be hard-
pressed to conceive of a less expensive method of doing that."
There is no evidence whatsoever that the cities' promise func-
tioned to insufficiently restrict the output of taxicab transportation
from the Airport. It would have been surprising had there been
any. It is unlikely that the cities were making either a transfer pay-
ment or a strategic move calculated to secure market power. The
rationale is similar to that applied to the actions of the Moore
County Board." As the purchasers of a service in a complex sales
transaction, the cities were interested in obtaining no less than ec-
onomically optimal output. No doubt, that interest prompted the
Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J. LAW & ECON. 61, 65-67 (1966).
88. Disputes related to those delicate interrelationships may themselves give rise to an-
titrust litigation which might ensnare local government. See, e.g., All Am. Cab Co. v. Metro-
politan Knoxville Airport, 1982-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65, 163 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
89. Cf. K. DAM, On. RESOURCEs: WHO GETs WHAT How? (1976).
90. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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cities to insist that Surtran's rates be prescribed by contract.91 Had
the contract not prescribed the rates, Surtran, as the sole supplier,
would probably have found it profitable both to charge higher
rates, thereby causing a decline in the amount demanded, and to
restrict output.9" Under the terms of the contract, the less efficient
the output, the less Surtran would pay the cities. The cities would
capture less quasi-rents, and Surtran would capture more of them.
That the cities' promises served the same kind of functions as
did the Moore County Board's promise suggests, without proving,
that those kinds of functions are usually served when a local gov-
ernment enters into agreements with suppliers and purchasers to
decline to buy from or sell to some or all of their rivals. This is true
regardless of whether the practice of making the promise is put to
a striking use, or merely a garden-variety one. Of course, the cities'
use of the practice seems striking only because we have come to
expect taxicab operators affiliated with several companies to solicit
business at major airports. In contrast, most of us have no expecta-
tions about the number of fixed based operators we would find at
any airport. Those few of us who do have such expectations may
well expect to find only one provider at smaller airports.
Occasionally, a local government's use of this practice seems
striking not so much because the practice is used in an unconven-
tional context, but because it really is supposed to serve some dif-
ferent, although not completely unrelated, function. These func-
tions are linked not to inducing efficient use of an existing capital
facility, but rather to enduring an additional investment in such a
facility which itself would represent an efficient use of resources.
The prospect of obtaining quasi-rents induces investment.
Thus, whether an investment is made will depend in large part on
the amount of quasi-rents it is likely to generate and the propor-
tion of those quasi-rents which the investors are likely to capture.
Often, capture poses few, if any, problems. For example, the rivalry
between potential suppliers of taxicab transportation and the rela-
tively low cost of replacing one supplier with another-in the event
the cities became dissatisfied with the service being ren-
dered-assured the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth of capturing
some of the quasi-rents generated by the taxpayers' investment in
the Airport.98 Without such assurance, the cities may have put less
91. The rates were probably part of the bid specifications.
92. Id. This would be an instance of the general phenomenon of "subgoal pursuit." See
Williamson, supra note 22, at 955.
93. In the absence of collusion, the System could expect the potential suppliers to com-
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capital into the airport, or none at all. Generally, in the absence of
such rivalry and low transactions costs, investors might reasonably
fear that any quasi-rents generated by their investment would be
captured or expropriated by others. They might hesitate to make
the investment, which they otherwise would have made, unless
before making it they enter into an agreement which provides as-
surance of capturing those quasi-rents.
A local government might wish to conclude such an agreement
either because one or more private enterprises wish to induce it to
make an investment on behalf of its taxpayers that it is otherwise
hesitant to make, or the local government wishes to induce one or
more private enterprises to make an investment that they are hesi-
tant to make. In either case, an integral part of the agreement
might very well be the common practice that was attacked in Pine-
hurst94 and in Woolen.95 That was certainly true of the agreements
that were the focus of Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.,". and Mason
City Center Associates v. City of Mason City.97 Congress enacted
statutes in 1957 and 1959, authorizing the District of Columbia Ar-
mory Board to build a stadium, subsequently named after Robert
F. Kennedy, "in order to provide the people of the District . ..
[with one] suitable for holding athletic events,"98 including profes-
sional football games. The Armory Board functioned as a city
agency, and was so treated by the courts.9 9 Nonetheless, the legis-
lative history of the authorizing statutes shows that Congress in-
tended to have the Armory Board use private enterprise methods
for the management of Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) Stadium.'00
The Armory Board did not initiate construction immediately.
Rather, in an effort to carry out Congress's intention, it initiated
negotiations for a long-term lease of the proposed stadium with the
professional football and baseball teams that played in the District
pete for the exclusive right to pick up passengers at the Airport by offering to purchase that
right for a payment almost equal in value to the quasi-rents which they hoped to capture.
Given the number of those potential suppliers, collusion was unlikely. The System could
also expect this supplier not only to offer the desired service but also to provide it, because
the supplier would know that if it welched, there were others who would be only too happy
to replace it and could do so quickly.
94. Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
95. Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
96. 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
97. 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th
Cir. 1982).
98. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1720 to -1721 (1967).
99. Hecht, 444 F.2d at 939.
100. Id. at 946.
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of Columbia. The football team was, and is, the Washington Red-
skins, whose corporate name is Pro-Football, Inc. Apparently, the
Armory Board would not have built the stadium had the negotia-
tions proved fruitless.10 1
The negotiations were successful. The Armory Board entered
into a thirty-year lease with the Redskins, commencing with the
start of the 1961 professional football season. The Board then
leased the land and built the stadium pursuant to a contract with
the Department of the Interior. The focus of the subsequent litiga-
tion was a restrictive covenant contained within the lease. The cov-
enant provided that the Armory Board would not lease RFK Sta-
dium to any other professional football team.
In 1965 Norman Hecht and his associates applied to the
American Football League (AFL) for an expansion franchise to be
located in the District of Columbia. At that time, the AFL was a
rival of the National Football League (NFL). The Redskins be-
longed to the NFL. To have AFL team owners seriously consider
his application, Hecht had to make some arrangements for the use
of a stadium to play a home game schedule. Apparently, the Ar-
mory Board's stadium was the only suitable facility in the District
of Columbia, 02 so Hecht offered to lease it for dates on which the
Redskins were not scheduled to play. The Armory Board expressed
a strong interest in accepting Hecht's offer, as did its landlord, the
Secretary of the Interior. 05 Despite their interest, the Board ad-
vised Hecht that it would reject his offer unless the Redskins
waived their rights under the restrictive covenant. The Redskins
refused to do so. Hecht then sued, among others,104 the Armory
Board and the Redskins. Hecht claimed that the restrictive cove-
nant was a contract in restraint of trade and a device to monopo-
lize the professional football market in the District of Columbia. 0 5
101. Id.
102. It is not clear from the opinions what happened to Griffiths' Park, the stadium
where the Redskins, as well as the Washington Senators baseball team, had been playing
their home games.
103. Note the all-too-ready willingness to welch, to act opportunistically, on the part of
this office-holder. This willingness reduced the value of the promises made on behalf of the
government he served. For a discussion of the implications of this phenomenon, see Gold
Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d
1005 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985); Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of
Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 1146
(8th Cir. 1982).
104. Hecht also sued the individual members of the Armory Board and the National
Football League.
105. Initially, the District Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment for the
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An inquiry into the real objection to the restrictive covenant
would have revealed that the economic context in which the Board
used it was largely identical to that in which the cities of Dallas
and Fort Worth made their controversial promise to Surtran. The
similarity would have been somewhat easier to see had the Armory
Board built RFK Stadium before trying to lease it. Suppose, for
analytical purposes, that it had. It now becomes clearer that the
Armory Board was trying to maximize the value of the stadium, a
capital facility like an airport, by arranging to have professional
football games exhibited there. The games added to the value of
the stadium in a more dramatic, but similar, manner as meeting
the requirements of arriving passengers for taxicab transportation
added to the value of the Airport. To the Armory Board, the exhi-
bition of football games was a "service" which it "purchased" from
the Redskins in exchange for an opportunity to earn a stream of
income. The Armory board "hired" the Redskins just as much as
the Redskins "hired" RFK Stadium. Further, assume that the Ar-
mory Board had "hired" the Redskins by auctioning off the exclu-
defendants on the ground that, under Parker v. Brown, the restrictive covenant was not
subject to scrutiny under the Sherman Act. 312 F. Supp. 472 (D.C. 1970) (citing Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The suit was tried by a jury, which reached a verdict for the defendants. The district
court entered judgment accordingly, and Hecht appealed. During the trial Hecht had re-
quested that the district court instruct the jury pursuant to the "essential facility doctrine."
That doctrine is: "'where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by would-be competi-
tors, those in possession of them must allow them to be shared on fair terms' or stand
condemned under the antitrust statutes." 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting A.
NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 67 (2d ed. 1970)). This peculiar notion,
that the antitrust laws require those with market power to share with at least some of their
would-be rivals, is also known as the bottleneck doctrine. Apparently, the disposition of a
number of reported cases has turned on this notion. See, e.g.,"International Boxing Club of
New York v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Rogers v.
Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 266 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 833 (1959);
Gamco v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 344 U.S.
817 (1952); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 362 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd on
appeal, 412 U.S. 924 (1973). Hecht asked that the jury be told that if it:
found (1) that use of RFK stadium was essential to the operation of a profes-
sional football team in Washington; (2) that such stadium facilities could not
practicably be duplicated by potential competitors; (3) that another team could
use RFK stadium in the Redskins' absence without interfering with the Red-
skins' use; and (4) that the restrictive covenant in the lease prevented equitable
sharing of the stadium by potential competitors, then . . . [it] must find the
restrictive covenant to constitute a contract in unreasonable restraint of trade,
in violation of the Sherman Act . . ..
570 F.2d 982, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The district court denied Hecht's request, which the
court of appeals held was error.
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sive right to exhibit professional football games at the stadium,
and it becomes clear that the restrictive covenant represented the
same kind of practice as the one challenged in Woolen. Under the
hypothesized conditions, the restrictive covenent would likely have
served the same kind of functions as did the cities' promise to Sur-
tran not to use any other taxicab supplier. In particular, it would
have helped the Armory Board capture the quasi-rents generated
by the investment in the stadium.
Under the actual circumstances, giving the Redskins a restric-
tive covenant probably helped the Board capture the quasi-rents,
but it did much more. If the Armory Board had not been assured
of capturing those quasi-rents, it would not have built the stadium.
Thus, the restrictive covenant helped induce the Armory Board to
make what we must presume to be an efficient investment. 106
Contrary to our supposition, of course, the Armory Board
tried to lease the stadium before building it. It did so because ri-
valry on the supply side of the professional football market in the
District of Columbia did not assure it of capturing those quasi-
rents. Had the Armory Board built the stadium first, it would
have found that the Redskins were the only folks interested in ob-
taining the short-term rights to use the stadium for professional
football games. Long-term rights might have generated some inter-
est among speculators hoping to resell them to teams that might
be assembled in the future. Given the risk of nonresale, however,
such speculators would probably not have offered to pay nearly as
much for those rights as the Redskins were prepared to offer. An
auction for the short term, or even the long term, rights would
have been costly and fruitless. Thus, also contrary to supposition,
the Armory Board tried to lease the stadium by negotiating di-
rectly with the Redskins.
Given the limited rivalry, if the Armory Board had built the
stadium first, the Redskins would likely have offered to lease it for
little more than the costs of operating it. That would be far less
than the Redskins would have been willing to offer in order to
make it worthwhile for the Armory Board to build it. The low-ball
offer would have been accepted because the Armory Board would
not have had a higher offer to choose from, and rejection would
have made the Armory Board worse off. Thus, the Redskins would
106. Because we must assume that the Armory Board acted to maximize the wealth of
those whom it represented, the mere fact that it was willing to pay for the stadium shows
that the value of the stadium in use exceeded its price.
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have captured most or all of the quasi-rents generated by the in-
vestment in the stadium. Because rivalry in the professional foot-
ball market would not assure the Armory Board of capturing the
quasi-rents, the Board tried to make contractual arrangements
that would afford them this assurance before building the stadium.
Those arrangements took the form of a lease.
To assure sufficient capture of the quasi-rents, the lease had to
have two key features. First, it had to be long-term. 107 Presumably,
the Redskins were willing to make yearly payments equal in value
to only a fraction of the quasi-rents. If they had been willing to
pay more, then they could have built the stadium themselves. The
longer the term of the lease, the greater the capture. A long-term
lease also provided some assurance to the Redskins that they
would capture the quasi-rents generated by their investment in
good-will. Those quasi-rents could be dissipated, in part, if the
Redskins had to move their NFL franchise to another metropoli-
tan area because of the inability to renew their short-term lease in
the only Washington stadium suitable for playing home games.'0 8
Of course, entering into a long-term lease incurred costs for
both the Armory Board and the Redskins. By doing so, each fore-
went future opportunities to earn more revenues by making alter-
native arrangements, and each ran the risk of opportunistic behav-
ior on the part of the other. The Redskins would not have incurred
such costs unless they expected the gains from entering into such a
lease to be greater than the potential loss. Assuming that the Ar-
mory Board acted with a profit motive, they too expected gains to
exceed losses. Apparently, for a lease term of thirty years, the sum
of the expected gains to the Redskins exceeded the sum of the ex-
pected costs by the greatest margin. That the Armory Board obli-
gated itself to repay the principal to its bondholders during the
same period may reflect a similar trade-off. Presumably, the Ar-
mory Board expected that by doing so, it minimized its capital
costs.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals heard the
appeal in this case and implicitly recognized that the lease had to
be long-term to assure sufficient capture of quasi-rents. 09 It did so
by acknowledging that the Armory Board would not have built the
107. See Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Consid-
erations, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 112, 116-17 (1971).
108. The costs of relocating might be substantial, and the costs of building the loyalty
of fans in the new locale might be even greater.
109. Hecht, 444 F.2d at 934.
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stadium unless it had entered into a long term lease with the Red-
skins. The court did not similarly recognize that the lease also had
to be exclusive, the second key feature. It is easy to see why it had
to be exclusive if one simply imagines what would have happened
had it not been. The Redskins would have perceived a far greater
chance of competition for ticket buyers with another football team
sometime during the thirty-year term of the lease. They would
then have been much less certain that they could charge those
ticket buyers enough to cover the quasi-rents generated by the in-
vestment in the stadium. Therefore, they would be unwilling to
pay as much to the Armory Board. The Armory Board would cap-
ture substantially less of those quasi-rents, although, given the lim-
ited rivalry in the District of Columbia professional football mar-
ket, it might have still captured some. Moreover, exclusivity
reduced the costs of entering into a long-term lease. Each side
would be somewhat more reluctant to act opportunistically for fear
of losing the returns to exclusivity. As in Woolen, those returns
became "hostage."
To conclude, the purpose of entering into a long-term lease
that assures sufficient capture of quasi-rents would have been
largely frustrated unless the lease had also been exclusive. Without
such assurance, the Armory Board would not have built the sta-
dium. Thus, the restrictive covenant functioned not only as did the
cities' promise to Surtran not to employ a competitive taxicab ser-
vice, but also to induce an investment that presumably represented
an efficient use of resources.
In Hecht the practice helped induce the purchaser of a service
to make an investment. In the appropriate situation, however, it
could just as easily help induce the provider of a service to make
an investment.110 For example, consider again the situation in
Pinehurst. When the Moore County Board was making its initial
arrangements for FBO service at the Southern Pines Airport, it
may have been searching for an operator who would expend re-
sources either to develop goodwill or to acquire tangible, special-
ized capital assets, like a building or some durable equipment. It
may have even been searching for an operator who would expressly
promise to make such investments. The Board may reasonably
have believed, however, that its search would likely come to nought
unless it allayed the fears of prospective operators that they would
110. It is rather unlikely that the practice helped induce the Redskins to make any
investment.
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be unable to capture the quasi-rents that might be generated by
such investments. On the one hand, the post-investment franchis-
ing of one or more additional operators might frustrate capture.
They might take a free ride on any goodwill that the original oper-
ator had developed, or through destructive competition eliminate
the value of all the specialized capital assets that the original oper-
ator had acquired. On the other hand, opportunistic behavior
might frustrate capture on the part of the Board. By promising to
make arrangements with only one operator, the Board may have
hoped to allay such fears. Presumably, that promise would tend to
foreclose the establishment of additional operators and dramati-
cally reduce the threat posed by any potential rivalry. Curiously, a
dramatic reduction in that threat would tend to substantially re-
duce the threat of opportunistic behavior on the part of the Board.
Such behavior could very well provoke the operator to retaliate in
kind. This retaliation would be more costly in the absence of in-
place alternative sources of FBO service. Thus, the Board would be
less likely to risk it.
By providing some contractual assurance of quasi-rent cap-
ture, the Board's promise may have helped to induce Resort to
make an investment. One cannot be sure because it is not clear
from the court's opinion whether Resort sought any investment.
Typically, when the practice under discussion is put to garden-va-
riety use, the user seeks no significant investment. Consider then a
more striking use of that practice, for example, the one challenged
in Mason City Center Associates v. City of Mason City."' In that
case, the plaintiffs sought a sizeable investment: the establishment
of a downtown regional shopping center. The Mason City City
Council promised the developer that it would use its powers to dis-
courage the development of any similar centers within the city lim-
its. That promise helped induce store owners to locate in the
downtown center, and thereby collectively make the desired
investment.
One might well wonder, however, what the City Council's
promise might have had to do with maximizing the wealth of Ma-
son City residents. After all, if the residents valued a downtown
regional shopping center so much, they presumably would have
been willing to pay for it. Investors would have then perceived the
center, a rather specialized asset, as a generator of quasi-rents, and
all else being equal, responded to the opportunity to earn those
111. 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
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rents by making an optimal investment in the center. An explana-
tion is necessary.
It is true that if the residents had valued a downtown center
so highly, they would have been willing to pay for it-provided
that they could not have enjoyed it otherwise. But each resident,
as an individual, would have perceived that it would be equally
available to him regardless of whether or not he paid. Downtown
store owners could not have even attempted to deny service to
nonpayers without negotiating an extraordinarily large number of
contracts, and then monitoring all of them. Prohibitively high
transaction costs would have made it uneconomical for those own-
ers to capture the quasi-rents that their investments would gener-
ate. Hence, they would have tended to make smaller ones than
they would have made had transaction costs been negligible.
The citizens of Mason City could have obtained more invest-
ment by arranging for the store owners to capture those quasi-
rents. The arrangements could have involved a promise to pay a
separate fee, a promise to maintain patronage at the downtown
stores even if store owners raised their sales prices to reflect those
quasi-rents, or a combination of the two. As long as the cost of the
arrangements was less than the value of the additional investment,
the new level of investment would be more optimal than the old.
Presumably, the citizens would have been interested in making
such arrangements only if the costs were low. By making such ar-
rangements, the citizens would have been purchasing a service-a
central business district service. It was in the context of such a
purchase that the City Council made its promise.
No arrangements would have been economical unless the citi-
zens could have avoided some of the transaction costs that the
owners would have had to incur in order to capture the quasi-
rents. The citizens could have eliminated the costs of negotiating a
very large number of contracts by acting through a previously des-
ignated agent with wide-ranging powers, the City Council."' They
would have had to do more, however, in order to reduce monitoring
and enforcement costs because even arrangements made by the
City Council might have entailed substantial costs.
112. Of course, the agent might not serve the interests of the principals as well as the
principals might like, but that is a problem endemic to the agency relationship. See Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Jenson &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976); Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution,
Attributes, 29 J. ECON. LIT. 1537 (1981).
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To illustrate, suppose that the Council promised, on behalf of
all the citizens, that they would maintain their patronage of the
downtown stores even if sales prices were raised to reflect quasi-
rents. The costs of monitoring, compliance, and enforcing such a
promise would boggle the mind. But those costs could almost be
eliminated while achieving the same end if the Council made a
functionally equivalent promise. The promise would be to discour-
age the development of any other regional shopping centers where
the residents might shop.
The making of that promise was the centerpiece of the ar-
rangements that the City Council actually made. 11 3 Presumably,
the promise made those arrangements cost-effective. Until the City
Council made that promise, its developer was notably unsuccessful
in obtaining commitments from store owners to locate in the pro-
posed downtown shopping center." 4 The promise helped induce an
investment. That was the function it was supposed to serve.
Nevertheless, Mason City Center Associates (MCCA) and Bea-
ver Farms, Inc. challenged the practice as an antitrust offense. Un-
fortunately, that challenge never prompted any court to make the
foregoing functional analysis, although the challenge ultimately
failed following a jury trial and an unsuccessful appeal by MCCA.
In arranging for central business district service, the Mason
City City Council took steps to assure investors that they would
capture the quasi-rents generated by any investment that they
might make in downtown stores. Those steps precluded the costs
that investors would otherwise have had to incur in order to effec-
tuate that capture. Clearly, the Council took those steps as the
agent for the consumers of that service, the residents of the city.
We must assume that a private enterprise agent in similar circum-
stances would have done the same. Presumably, it would have
taken those steps only if by doing so it would have provided suffi-
cient assurance, at a low enough cost, so that the service could be
obtained most cost-effectively by purchasing it from a privately
owned provider, thereby paying the investors to bear the risk of
noncapture or expropriation. Therefore we must infer that the
Council somehow provided that assurance.
Not all local governments attempting to arrange for central
business district service would have been able to do likewise. For
113. The City Council also made some payments. It hired the developer and funded,
with bonds, some of the development.
114. 671 F.2d at 1148.
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example, consider the city council of a city occupying far fewer
square miles than Mason City. On the one hand, had it taken the
same steps as the Mason City City Council, it might have provided
negligible, if any, assurance. Moreover, it might not have had the
power to take other steps that would have provided more assur-
ance. On the other hand, it might have been able to provide suffi-
cient assurance but only by taking expensive steps, like making an-
cillary arrangements with the owners'" of land lying beyond the
city limits. Taking these steps might cost more than the additional
central business district service was worth.
Generally, when arranging for any service requiring an invest-
ment, any local government might be unable to provide investors
with sufficient assurance of quasi-rents capture,"" or be unable to
provide sufficient assurance without incurring prohibitive costs.
Prospective investors dealing with a local government that was so
disabled would face a greater risk of expropriation. Presumably,
they would not invest without being compensated for it, so they
would demand a larger payment from the residents. That demand
might make the Mason City's method for obtaining service much
more expensive than an alternative method which might be more
cost-effective. That alternative could be the purchasing of the ser-
vice from a collectively owned provider and internally bearing the
risk of expropriation.
Using that method, without more, might itself be so expensive
that residents would be better off by simply doing without the ser-
vice. Using it would entail more than just arranging for the service
to be provided. It would also entail entering into a risk-bearing
agreement, which might involve extraordinarily large negotiating
costs. It may also prevent the parties from expropriating the quasi-
rents,1 7 and this might involve even larger monitoring and en-
forcement costs. Presumably, residents would use this alternative
only if they could adequately contain these costs.
115. Among those owners who would likely have been the residents of other cities who
exercised their rights, including the power to zone, collectively, through their local govern-
ments. Making arrangements with such owners would have been especially expensive be-
cause enforcement costs might be infinite.
116. More precisely, the cost of proving it would have been infinite.
117. If the residents did not collectively prevent each other from individually expropri-
ating the quasi-rents, then, in the end, the majority of the citizens would probably pay
substantially more for the service then it was worth to them. That would be obvious where
the local government had borrowed the funds to make the investment from bondholders.
See Glenwillow Landfill, 485 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ohio 1979), aff'd sub nom. Hybud Equip.
Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1983), on remand, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,356 (N.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984).
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The owners of a private enterprise could find themselves in a
similar situation. They might wish to obtain a service, like whole-
sale distribution or retail marketing, that could only be provided if
a substantial investment were made. Their management, however,
might be disabled in the same way as was our hypothetical local
government. They could then obtain the service most cost-effec-
tively by creating their own service provider, subject to the com-
mands of their management, and bearing the risk of expropriation
themselves. Using that method to obtain the service would still be
expensive. Whether the owners used it or simply did without the
service would depend upon how well they thought management
could use hierarchical controls to contain' those costs. Apparently,
owners of private enterprises find themselves in such situations all
the time and frequently believe that their management skills can
contain these costs. That is why we often observe pervasive and
persistent use of this method, which we call vertical integration.118
In such situations residents may be able to best contain these
transaction costs by acting through their local government. Indeed,
in some instances that might be the only way in which they could
avoid incurring prohibitive transaction costs. By having their local
government bear the risk of expropriation, they could practically
eliminate the costs of negotiating an agreement. For that agree-
ment, they could in effect substitute their governance arrange-
ments where local government is constituted and empowered to act
as the residents' general agent.
Ironically, this action, which could practically eliminate nego-
tiation costs, could raise monitoring and enforcement costs. By
having the local government bear the risk, the residents would give
themselves an incentive to act as free-riders and thereby expropri-
ate the quasi-rents generated by their collective investment. A
free-rider, as an individual consumer, would reap all of the gains
from his behavior, while, as an "owner," he would suffer only a
fraction of the losses because the total loss would be shared with
all other residents. Monitoring residents who have such incentives
and enforcing "anti-free-rider" ordinances against them would
likely be prohibitively expensive, even if residents had their local
government undertake these activities.
The residents might be able to effectuate the same end far
more cheaply by having their local government control the behav-
ior, not of the potential free-riders, but of those with whom they
118. Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 63, at 297.
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would deal. That, of course, is precisely what the residents of Ma-
son City had their City Council do. As in the Mason City case, the
local government will typically exert control pursuant to an agree-
ment with those responsible for actually performing the service, or
those who stand in their shoes financially. Under that agreement,
local government will be obligated to refuse to make similar agree-
ments with some, or all, of their rivals. In short, it will use the
same practice challenged in Mason City and Hecht. Its use will be
distinctive in that it will be laced with coercion. Indeed, an ordi-
nance may complement this practice. It will, however, serve the
same kind of functions as seen in prior cases.
The local government's "ownership," or more precisely for our
purposes acting "ownership" of the service provider, may obscure
the practice itself and, especially, the functions it is supposed to
serve. For example, suppose that the Mason City City Council had
"owned" the downtown stores. It might have then been difficult to
even recognize that the Council had entered into an agreement
with the supplier of a service to refuse to deal with the supplier's
rivals. It would certainly have been difficult to understand what
functions were served by the Council's promise to the developers
and its related refusal to grant the plaintiff's rezoning request. Be-
cause it would not have been at all clear that the Council had ac-
ted on behalf of the consumers of central business district service,
it might have appeared that the Council's actions were designed to
restrict output. Similar difficulties would have beset the Hecht
analysis had the District of Columbia Armory Board "owned" the
Redskins. 119
Where a local government does "own," or act for the "owners"
of, the service provider, however, it is critical that the court recog-
nize the practice and understand its functions. It is critical because
such situations are particularly apt to arise in connection with ser-
vices designed to promote the health and safety of residents. In
arranging for them, a local government would find it most difficult
to bind itself120 and its residents, 121 or to protect itself and its resi-
dents from being "held up" by a privately owned service pro-
119. That is not as farfetched as it might seem, as the resident "owners" of the Green
Bay Packers football team can attest.
120. For example, a promise not to regulate the providers of such services would proba-
bly be unenforceable and would certainly be incredible. See generally T. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 43-46 (1960).
121. Politicians and bureaucrats who attempted to directly control the choices of resi-
dents with respect to such services would probably succeed only in getting themselves voted
out of office or fired.
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vider.12 2 Residents might, therefore, wish to obtain them from a
collectively owned provider and bear the risk of expropriation
themselves; however, that might not be economical unless the local
government used the practice to control the behavior of free-riders.
Only local government can control behavior because only local gov-
ernment can use power laced with coercion. Indeed, it is a funda-
mental purpose of local government to use the practice to make
arrangements for just such services. In legal argot, these actions
are called exercises of the police power. Thus, if the practice ran
afoul of the antitrust statutes, local government, as we know it,
would truly be transformed. For this reason, it is worth illustrating
the appropriate analysis of the practice when used by a local gov-
ernment that "owns," or acts for the "owners" of, the service pro-
vider. To that end, consider Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kan-
sas City.
128
Gold Cross Ambulance arose out of efforts by Kansas City of-
ficials to create a publicly owned advanced-life-support/quick-re-
sponse ambulance system. As part of that effort, the city con-
tracted with Ambulance Services, Inc. (ASI) to meet ambulance
system requirements for Kansas City residents. ASI was obligated
to use the city's emergency vehicles."" It was also obligated to pro-
vide service with specified medical care and response-time charac-
teristics. In fact, the city was to pay for ASI's service only if ASI
fulfilled its obligations. The city was obligated to actually make the
payments that were due. ASI was thereby relieved of the task of
directly collecting from resident users. The city also promised, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, that similar arrangements would not be made
with any of ASI's rivals during the term of the contract. It fulfilled
that promise by granting an operating license only to ASI, and by
adopting a complementary ordinance that provided that only those
holding such licenses could pick up patients within the city lim-
122. A local government that was "held up" would find itself in a "hostage" situation,
with those demanding the service serving as the hostages. It is rather difficult to respond to
that situation with a "we-will-not-negotiate" posture, which is one reason why we find gov-
ernments noteworthy that do so consistently, like the Israeli national government.
123. 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1864 (1985).
124. Initially, the city leased the vehicles from ASI and then subleased them back. By
the time of the second contracting, the city had purchased them outright in accord with the
full implementation of the "public utility model," a plan that avoids the problems associ-
ated with emerging ambulance services due to its cost structure. Gold Cross Ambulance v.




its. 12 5 Thus, Kansas City used the practice analyzed in this article
in the context under discussion.
That practice was challenged as an antitrust offense in a suit
brought against the city and ASI by two privately owned ambu-
lance companies. The companies operated out of nearby Indepen-
dence, and both had been unable to compete for several large con-
tracts to provide nonemergency ambulance service at institutions
located in Kansas City. The city and its affiliates moved for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that the practice was
permissible under the state action exemption to the antitrust
laws.1
26
The court granted their motion, ruling that when the Missouri
legislature enacted statutes that permitted municipalities to own
and operate ambulance systems 127 and subjected private ambu-
lance operators to licensure and related regulations,'28 the state
had authorized Kansas City to use the challenged practice.129 On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 130 Nevertheless, the ruling was
erroneous because it does not appear that those statutes even
speak to the practice, much less reflect any discernible state policy
favoring its use. 131 Because the court's holding may not be followed
125. Id. at 1009-10.
126. Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 961 (W.D. Mo.
1982). The city also moved for summary judgment on the ground that the tenth amendment
to the Constitution insulated its regulations from the antitrust laws. Id. at 967. The plain-
tiff-ambulance owners, however, moved for summary judgment on several grounds. They
asserted that their activities were in the nature of lobbying efforts, which the first amend-
ment also insulates from the antitrust laws. With respect to the plaintiffs' fourteenth
amendment claims, the court reasoned that the city had properly exercised its police powers
in regulating ambulance companies and that the plaintiffs did not have a property right in a
license to operate an ambulance company. Id. at 970. Finally, regarding the plaintiffs' equal
protection claim, the court stated that the plaintiffs were not in fact similarly situated as are
other ambulance companies because plaintiffs did not have a license to operate. Id. at 973.
127. Mo. ANN.. STAT. § 67.300 (Vernon 1985).
128. Id. §§ 190.105, .115, .120, .125, .145, .175.
129. Gold Cross Ambulance, 538 F. Supp. at 964.
130. 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
131. The Missouri statute on point reads as follows:
67.300. Counties and cities, towns and villages authorized to
operate ambulance service-rates may be set-insurance
may be purchased
1. Any county, city, town or village may provide a general ambulance
service for the purpose of transporting sick or injured persons to a
hospital, clinic, sanatorium or other place for treatment of the illness
or injury, and for that purpose may
(1) Acquire by gift or purchase one or more motor vehicles suitable
for such purpose and may supply and equip the same with such
materials and facilities as are necessary for emergency treatment,
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in similar actions, it is useful to consider the legality of Kansas
City's practice.
Had the court not considered Kansas City's conduct "exempt
from the operation of the Sherman Act,"' 2 the court might still
have deemed the city's practice legal. That would have depended,
or at least should have depended, on the functions served by the
city's conduct. Those functions can best be deduced by examining
the economic context in which the city used the practice, and then
applying the familiar assumption that Kansas City officials acted
to maximize the wealth of the city's residents.
The residents of Kansas City had been purchasing ambulance
service long before the creation of the advanced-life-support/quick-
response system. In the years immediately preceding the system's
creation, they made their purchases from a number of providers on
a spot market. Apparently, Kansas City officials came to believe
that the available service on the market was substantially inferior,
in terms of medical care and response time, to the service for
which residents would have been willing to pay. That belief was
reasonable because considerable transaction costs would have
stood between the residents' willingness to pay, and any provider's _
receipt of revenues. Those transaction costs would have been the
costs of exclusion, search, and collection. Because of them, a pro-
vider of superior ambulance service would have had little, if any,
chance of earning enough to cover his higher costs. This is true
when realizing that the return on his larger investment would not
be commensurate with his sizeable risk. Consider those costs
and may operate, maintain, repair and replace such vehicles, supplies
and equipment;
(2) Contract with one or more individuals, municipalities, counties,
associations or other organizations for the operation, maintenance
and repair of such vehicles and for the furnishing of emergency
treatment;
(3) Employ any combination of the methods authorized in subdivi-
sions (1) and (2) of this section.
2. The municipality or county shall formulate rules and regulations
for the use of the equipment and may fix a schedule of fees or
charges to be paid by persons requesting the use of the facilities and
provide for the collection thereof.
3. The municipality or county may purchase insurance indemnifying
against liability of the county or city and the driver and attendants
of the ambulance for the negligent operation of the ambulance or
other equipment or supplies or in rendering services incidental to the
furnishing of the ambulance service.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 67.300 (Vernon 1985).




The costs of exclusion would have prevented a provider of su-
perior ambulance service from obtaining revenues from most of
those who would have benefited from it. This may seem counter-
productive under the rationale that those who are transported and
cared for in ambulances usually pay a fee. Those who are trans-
ported and receive care in ambulances, however, are not the only
parties who benefit by the service. Almost every resident of Kansas
City benefits because in the course of producing the services, a pro-
vider also produces another valuable good: the availability of that
service. The provider would find it rather expensive, however, to
stop any resident from enjoying the benefits of that availability. In
fact, the costs of exclusion would probably be prohibitive since
availability is regularly deemed a public service. As a result, no res-
ident would have any incentive to pay for the service. A provider
of a superior service would obtain revenues, then, only from those
wishing to be transported in an ambulance.
Not all of those who need ambulance transport and assistance
would have used the provider's service. The costs of advertising
their services would have prevented the provider from obtaining
the patronage of those residents willing to pay a premium for supe-
rior ambulance service, but unaware of its availability. Attempting
to remedy such ignorance by supplying credible information about
medical care and response time would have been quite expensive.
Moreover, it might not have done much good because those who
summon an ambulance are rarely the users, and the summoner
might be ignorant, fail to appreciate the preferences of the user, or
act opportunistically.
133
Obtaining patronage, of course, does not itself fill the coffers
of ambulance service providers. Collecting fees does. Their costs of
collection, however, prevent them from obtaining revenues from all
of their patrons. In large part, these costs are high because an am-
bulance provider usually seeks payment after, rather than before,
service is rendered. If a provider refused service, especially emer-
gency service, until it had secured payment, or at least information
suggesting that payment would be made in the near future,"" resi-
133. For example, the dispatcher at a nursing home might summon an ambulance from
a particular provider because he was paid to do so. Jack Stout, one of the defendants in
Gold Cross Ambulance and a consultant to cities on ambulance service, told me that he was
aware of ambulance companies who strongly encouraged their female personnel to date male
dispatchers for that purpose.
134. The provider might insist, for example, that the would-be user prove that he
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dents would become aware of that practice 135 and tend to summon
a rival provider. Thus, there may be a substantial disparity be-
tween the revenues that an ambulance service provider earns, and
those that it receives. That disparity would be especially painful to
a provider of superior service because of the greater costs superior
service incurs.
These three transaction costs must be large enough to offset
the economics of dispatching and positioning that a single provider
would have enjoyed.1' 6 Otherwise, a single provider would probably
have been able to drive all his rivals out of the market. In any
event, such costs were likely to be so large that the revenues ob-
tainable on the spot market would have been insufficient to induce
any provider to acquire emergency vehicles, hire trained personnel,
and operate the sophisticated positioning and dispatching system
necessary to supply advanced-life-support/quick-response ambu-
lance service in an amount which would otherwise have been
optimal.
Not surprisingly, then, Kansas City officials also came to be-
lieve that the amount of ambulance service supplied would be
closer to optimal if it were sold off the spot market. It does appear
that by selling off the spot market a provider could reduce the
costs of exclusion, search, and collection. He could reduce the costs
of exclusion by selling his service pursuant to a requirements con-
tract, and he could reduce the costs of search and collection by
including provisions in the contract that specified the requirements
that his service must meet, and by placing the risk of nonpayment
owned an effective insurance policy which covered ambulance service or, in the alternative,
durable assets not exempt from execution, and of sufficient value to exceed the costs of the
service and collection.
135. It may seem inconsistent to assert that, on the one hand, many residents would
have become aware of a provider's refusal to render ambulance service prior to receiving
payment while, on the other, those same residents would have remained unaware of the
superiority of that service. But it is not. The difference between the two assertions simply
reflects the different costs of acquiring and verifying different information. To acquire and
verify information about the quality of ambulance service (response times and medical
care), residents would have had to undertake an arduous study. To acquire and verify infor-
mation about a pay-before-you-go-to-the-hospital practice, however, he would have had only
to open a local newspaper or tune to a local broadcasting station for a report on the result-
ing deaths.
136. If transaction costs were negligible, one firm could provide dispatching and posi-
tioning service and other firms could make the ambulance runs. The transaction costs, how-
ever, are considerable, in large part because the firms providing the runs tend to resist direc-
tions from the dispatcher involving the less profitable runs. Center for Economic &
Management Research, University of Oklahoma, A Process for Setting Community and
State Policies Regarding EMS System Performance Capabilities (1974) (unpublished work).
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on the buyers. None of the suppliers entered into such a contract
because the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing this
type of contract are prohibitive. The provider would have to nego-
tiate contracts with perhaps hundreds of thousands of residents in
order to make the nonpayment provisions palatable. Each contract
would necessitate complex performance standards, require a long-
term commitment, and be contingent upon obtaining the signature
of all the parties. Once the parties signed contracts, the provider
would have to identify nonsigners and prevent them from using
the service. This would have been difficult because many users
might have been away from their homes. Consequently, they would
be unable to identify themselves or their location. Denial of service
in those situations would have catastrophic consequences. If the
demand charge or option fee were low enough, the provider would
also have to prevent signers from using rival providers. Otherwise,
he would fail to cover those capacity costs reflected in his schedule
of user fees, such as the charges for transportation and care. More-
over, the provider would have to assure residents that they would
receive the service for which they had contracted. That would not
have been easy because residents would be hard-pressed to assess
the provider's performance, and even harder pressed to take action
against the provider if the users found the service wanting because
a recalcitrant provider might respond to enforcement with a cur-
tailment of service.
Kansas City residents could have reduced these costs had they
taken collective action through the city. The city could have struck
the necessary agreements on their behalf and thereby dramatically
reduced negotiating costs. The city also could have used coercion
to prevent would-be rivals who had not already entered into an
agreement from selling ambulance service to residents. This would
have substantially reduced the costs of monitoring the behavior of
residents and enforcing anti-free-rider provisions against them. Fi-
nally, the city could have hired personnel to assess the service that
was provided and, if its quality did not meet contractual stan-
dards, withhold payment or otherwise secure better service. That
action might have reduced monitoring and enforcement costs
somewhat because the city would likely have enjoyed some econo-
mies of scale in carrying out those tasks. Monitoring and enforce-
ment costs probably would have remained prohibitive unless the
city made arrangements with only one provider. If the court re-
quired the city to make arrangements with more than one pro-
vider, each provider then would have an incentive to act oppor-
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tunistically in order to try to avoid those calls where performance
standards were most difficult to meet.
Although taking such collective action would have reduced the
costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing requirements con-
tracts for ambulance service, it would probably not have provided
assurance to investors of quasi-rent capture sufficient to induce the
investment necessary to create an advanced-life-support/quick-re-
sponse system. In fact, it is likely that those actions would have
inadvertently put the prospective owners at greater risk. The rea-
son is that once an advanced-life-support/quick-response system is
established and operational, opportunistic behavior by city officials
might dissipate quasi-rents. For example, city officials might de-
clare a medical emergency or simply abrogate the contract, or por-
tions of it, or they might regulate rates. In light of the possible
impact of ambulance service on the health and welfare of Kansas
City residents, a promise by the city that its officials would refrain
from such conduct would probably be unenforceable, if not unbe-
lievable. The premium the owners would have demanded for bear-
ing this risk of moral hazard would probably have amounted to a
substantial fraction of the value of the service. The residents would
have been reluctant to pay the service. They would have been par-
ticularly reluctant because they would have to bear the parallel
moral hazard risk that the provider would reduce the level of ser-
vice provided, or threaten to do so in order to obtain more reve-
nues. That would be an acute risk if, to economize on monitoring
and enforcement costs, the city had entered into a service agree-
ment with only one provider. The effect of contracting with only
one provider would make it much more difficult to replace the pro-
vider quickly.
Thus, it was quite reasonable for Kansas City officials to be-
lieve that no privately owned provider -would supply the kind of
service that could be produced with an advanced-life-support/
quick-response system. The costs of capturing the quasi-rents gen-
erated by such a system would have been prohibitive. Thus, if the
residents desired to obtain an advanced-life-support/quick-re-
sponse system, they would have to obtain it from a publicly-owned
provider. They could do so, without negotiating a risk-bearing
agreement, by having the city acquire the necessary emergency ve-
hicles to actually make the runs. That would mean, however, that
the residents would bear the risk to expropriate the quasi-rent
themselves. The quasi-rents generated by the system could be ex-
propriated by residents who might welch on the implicit agreement
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to purchase their requirement of -ambulance transportation and
care from the city-owned provider.
Many residents would have an incentive to welch on their
agreement. By purchasing service from a noncity-owned provider,
a resident could pocket any difference in rates. There would be a
difference in rates because the city-owned provider's rates proba-
_ bly would reflect at least some capacity costs, while the rates of the
alternative provider's would not. The city could have eliminated
that potential gain by setting its provider's rates so that they did
not reflect any capacity costs. If it had done so, residents might
very well have to bear even more costs than they would otherwise
have as a result of welching. They would have to bear additional
taxes to cover those capacity costs, and they would have to bear
the expense of inefficient behavior prompted by that taxation.
Generally, residents would have been tempted to try to reap the
gain from rate differences whenever they preferred the price/per-
formance of the noncity-owned provider to that of the city-owned
one. This preference would be especially prevalent at a time when
there was no need of emergency service, and obtaining nonemer-
gency service from a noncity-owned provider was convenient. The
costs of making the purchase would be almost zero. The chances of
being caught would also have been small, and it seems likely that if
one were caught, the penalty would not have been harsh. Of
course, whenever a resident purchased ambulance service from a
noncity-owned provider, he would have also suffered a loss. The
city-owned provider would have realized fewer revenues, and the
value of his interest would have been diminished. Because he
would have shared that revenue shortfall with many others, how-
ever, his gain would have likely exceeded his loss. Thus, the incen-
tive to welch, at least when obtaining nonemergency service, would
have been strong. Unless the city checked the response to this in-
centive, it is quite possible that collective risk-bearing, even
through the city, would have been prohibitively expensive.
The agreement between Kansas City and ASI, and the com-
plementary ordinance, made it much more costly for noncity-
owned providers to operate in Kansas City. Thus, the challenged
practice served an instrumental function in securing more nearly
optimal ambulance service for the residents of Kansas City.1' 7 The
137. It enabled Kansas City to solve a problem of organizational design that confronts
every firm: "the need to organize transactions in such a way as to economize on bounded
rationality while simultaneously safeguarding the transactions in question against opportu-
nism." Williamson, supra note 22, at 958.
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court should have condemned it as an offense only if the court
deemed that function undesirable according to the principles em-
bodied in the antitrust statutes.
B. Are Any of the Functions Objectionable?
In Pinehurst, Woolen, Hecht, Mason City and Gold Cross
Ambulance, the legal problems of the defendant local government
grew out of its efforts to purchase a "service," broadly conceived,
at the lowest possible price. Each tried to make the purchase by
entering into a complex sales transaction, an integral part of which
was a promise not to buy from any of the supplier's rivals. That
practice, which is used by virtually every local government, is al-
most invariably intended to serve one or more of the four functions
in the illustrative cases. Most of these functions are related to the
avoidance of transaction costs. Individuals and groups generally
enter into complex sales transactions instead of making spot mar-
ket purchases for that very purpose. 38 The four functions are: (1)
to help secure efficiently provided service by permitting the sup-
plier to enjoy either economies of production or transaction; (2) to
help reduce transaction costs, particularly monitoring and enforce-
ment costs, of arranging for the service; (3) to help reduce the
transaction costs of capturing quasi-rents; (4) and by reducing
these costs, to help induce investment when providing the service
requires an additional investment.
Serving those functions is consistent with the principle that it
is good to maximize consumer welfare. That should not be surpris-
ing because local governments invariably use the practice of exclu-
sivity as part of a sales transaction, and sales transactions gener-
ally tend to increase consumer welfare. In fact, as already noted,"3 '
the only sales transactions that do not are those which are largely
transfer payments, and those that are strategic maneuvers
designed to obtain market power. Only transactions that are stra-
tegic tend to reduce consumer welfare, and they are usually un-
common-especially among local governments. There is certainly
no evidence that the defendant local governments engaged in such
behavior.
When this most common local government practice is sup-
138. "The basic presumption of the transaction cost approach [which is the approach
taken here] is that successive interfaces are organized in a manner that economizes on trans-
action costs." Id.
139. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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posed to serve functions one and two, it obviously tends to maxi-
mize consumer welfare. It tends to reduce the total costs incurred
in making available a given output of a particular service. That
cannot be said about the practice when it serves only function
three. Viewed statically, the practice tends to maximize consumer
welfare only in the sense that it may be the most cost-effective
means by which investors can capture the quasi-rents generated by
a service-related investment, an activity in which they are likely to
engage in any event. Total costs will not vary with the identity of
the individuals who can economically effectuate that capture.
Viewed dynamically, however, total costs will vary. Unless poten-
tial investors can economically ' effectuate capture, they may not
make the service-related investment, and without it, the total costs
incurred in making available a given output of the service may be
much greater than they would otherwise be. Indeed, they may be
infinite. Thus, when the practice is supposed to induce investment,
function four, it tends to promote efficiency. To restate this idea
more technically, whichever function the practice is supposed to
serve, it tends to lower the supply curve. In a sense, it thereby
"liberates" resources for other uses, which may include the produc-
tion of more of that particular service or of something else entirely.
That means that as a result of using the practice of promising ex-
clusivity, the total personal value of all goods and services pro-
duced will tend to be higher than it would otherwise be. Thus, the
practice is unobjectionable on grounds related to the wealth of
creation.
The practice could be objectionable, if at all., only on grounds
related to the wealth of distribution. In any particular instance of
its use, one could certainly identify those who appear to suffer a
detriment as a result of taking part in a transaction. They are the
rivals of the chosen supplier who would have liked to do business
with the local government, or in the case of Johnny-come-latelies,
those who would like the local government to welch on its promise.
Presumably, they are the ones who should benefit by the applica-
tion of any wealth-distribution principle, according to which the
functions served by the practice are undesirable. It is easy enough,
then, to describe the general characteristics of the wealth-distribu-
tion principle. There are two. First, the principle must be based on
an intellectually acceptable distinction between a group that in-
cludes those who seem to be worse off, and another group that in-
cludes the chosen supplier and the local government, even if the
latter is included only as a confederate. Second, it must provide
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that it is good to prefer the first group to the second one. Finding a
principle with these characteristics that will help resolve a specific
dispute, however, is difficult at best.
For example, consider the problems one would have in finding
this type of principle for the Pinehurst dispute. One could identify
those who seem to be worse off as a result of the arrangements
between the Moore County Board and Resort. They are fixed
based operators, not including Resort, who upon reasonable notice
could begin providing FBO service at Southern Pines Airport, and
others, like Pinehurst, who could have done so without incurring
heavy start-up costs even though they were not already established
as fixed based operators. It is no simple task to distinguish in an
intellectually acceptable way between that group and another one
which includes Resort. Even if we suppose that a distinction could
be made, one would still be confronted with an intractable problem
in logic. The principle that it is good to prefer the first group to
the second one will not help resolve the dispute because penalizing
the Board for engaging in the practice would not give the preferred
group any advantage. Penalizing the Board would deter fixed
based operators from agreeing to provide FBO service in reliance
on the kind of promise that the Board made to Resort. In the ab-
sence of this agreement, FBO service would seem more costly to
the Board and to other airport-owning local governments. They
could be expected to purchase less of it, or to offer less in exchange
for it, than they otherwise would. In either event, the preferred
group would not be better off, but worse off. The dynamics of mar-
kets will cause the search for a wealth-distribution principle to
yield about as much as a snipe hunt.
One could willfully ignore these dynamics and search for the
principle on the basis of analogy. The cases are legion where the
court entertained similar challenges to the practice when private
enterprises engaged in the practice of exclusivity.4 0 Unfortunately,
these cases may be bountiful, but not helpful. Most of the opinions
do little more than affix one or more antitrust labels to the prac-
tice. Although the labels colorfully describe the obvious: the plain-
tiffs were made worse off as a result of a contract that restrained
their trade; they do not expressly disclose the wealth distribution
principle upon which the cases were actually decided.
140. For recent examples, see Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co.,
676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 47
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 57 (N.D. IIl. 1984).
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Analyzing the cases, it is possible to determine that the princi-
ple must have been that it is good to prefer private holdings of
wealth which are "smaller" or "less advantaged" to those which are
"larger" or "more advantaged." As suggested previously,14 that
principle seems to be rooted in a two-part rationale. Recall that
one part is the public choice theory that one may explain political
behavior largely on the basis of the relative wealth of the private
antagonists interested in influencing it, and the other part is popu-
list ideology, which holds that behavior will be "better" the more
wide and even the distribution of wealth.
Analyzing by the basis of analogy will yield a wealth-distribu-
tion principle, but that principle is inapplicable to disputes be-
tween the plaintiff, private enterprises, and defendant local gov-
ernments. Even if we ignore the dynamics of markets, it is
inapplicable on its own terms. It simply does not tell us that it is
good to prefer some private holdings of wealth to any public hold-
ings. One could try to expand the principle so that the nonpre-
ferred group would include "larger" or "more advantaged" public
holdings of wealth. That group could then include local govern-
ments using the practice if they arranged with a supplier for a
"large" quantity of service, or if the court ipso facto deemed par-
ties to the arrangements "more advantaged" than nonparties. Even
if the court so extended the principle, and one would almost have
to compromise one's intellectual honesty to do so, it would still be
inapplicable in light of the rationale on which it is based. The
crude public choice theory does not even purport to tell us what
effect the distribution of wealth between private enterprises and
local governments will have on political behavior. Certainly, popu-
lism does not even hint that political behavior will be better if
wealth is redistributed from local governments, and the taxpayers
they represent, to private enterprises. Indeed, local government is
a populist-preferred institution.
No principle of wealth distribution or wealth creation suggests
that the functions served by this practice are undesirable. The
practice is, in and of itself,142 lawful when engaged in by local
governments.
A reassessment of most of the other local government prac-
tices attacked as antitrust offenses would yield similar conclu-
141. See supra text accompanying note 5.
142. Of course, if nonimmune local governments somehow found a way to use it solely
as a part of a strategic manuever to become a monopolist or as part of the operations of a
classic cartel, they would run afoul of the antitrust statutes.
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sions.'4 Thus, local government may emerge unscathed from its
battle with antitrust law, but antitrust law could undergo profound
change.
IV. THE IMPACT OF REASSESSMENT ON ANTITRUST LAW
To understand why antitrust law could undergo profound
change, one must understand that Boulder and Lafayette reflect
local governments' enjoyment of rather limited immunity. In addi-
tion, the principles used in evaluating their conduct should be the
same as those used in evaluating the conduct of private enter-
prises. In both cases, the court relegated local governments to the
same treatment accorded private enterprises. Apparently, the
Court reached those results purposefully. In Lafayette the Court
explained, "[Our decision] means . . . that when the State itself
has not directed or authorized an anticompetitive practice, the
State's subdivisions in exercising their delegated power must obey
the antitrust laws." ' Unless the Court was employing double-
speak, its language, quoted with approval in Boulder,' 5 must mean
that substantive antitrust principles apply with equal force to
nonimmune local governments and private enterprises. Any other
reading of that language would be inconsistent with the Court's
rejection of the proposition that the applicability of the federal an-
titrust statutes turns on the status of the defendant.
The Court's analysis of the municipalities' arguments in La-
fayette also reinforces the "same treatment" teaching. The Court
rejected what it apparently understood to be the municipalities'
first argument-that the Sherman and Clayton Acts must not ap-
ply to them because using, or threatening to use, the acts' sanc-
tions against the cities would disrupt their essential operations, a
result which those statutes were not designed to achieve. The
Court seemed to recognize that pursuant to its decision, however,
trial judges would be bound to apply the same substantive anti-
trust principles to all defendants. 4 6 Only the application of those
143. M. LEE, ANTITRUST LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (forthcoming from Greenwood
Press). Cf. Lopatka, State Action and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Ap-
proach, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (1984).
144. 435 U.S. 389, 416 (1978).
145. 455 U.S. 40, 57 (1982).
146. 435 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1978). In fact, the Court misconstrued the cities' first argu-
ment. "Regardless of whether their defense may ultimately succeed at trial," asserted the
cities, "merely exposing city governments to injunctions, treble damage liability, and per-
haps criminal prosecution under the federal antitrust statutes will produce enormous uncer-
tainty and hesitancy among public officials and disserve the public interest .... Elected
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principles would be likely to lead to such disruption. The Court
merely suggested that the result might be avoided by limiting the
remedies available to prevailing plaintiffs. The Court also rejected
the municipalities' second argument-that applying the Sherman
and Clayton Acts to municipalities would be inconsistent with the
general purpose of the antitrust statutes. The municipalities erro-
neously claimed that the general purpose of the antitrust statutes
was to check "private power derived from amassed capital or
shrewd business practice,"'14 7 thus providing protection against
abuses of that power. 48 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority
of the Court, observed that local governments, like private enter-
prises, could bring about the precise harm that Congress designed
the federal antitrust statutes to prevent. 4 9 Presumably, the courts
should consider conduct that causes this economic harm a viola-
tion no matter whether it is engaged in by private enterprises or
local governments. This result is obtained only if the courts apply
the same substantive antitrust principles to all defendants. Finally,
in accepting only an attenuated version of the municipalities' third
argument-that the Sherman and Clayton Acts are inapplicable to
them under Parker because they are merely subdivisions of a state
and exercise only those powers granted by it'5 0-the Court ruled
that local governments are entitled to no more immunity than that
enjoyed by state agencies under Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar."5'
Surely, they are entitled to no more lenient treatment on the mer-
its. On that point Goldfarb is instructive. In Goldfarb, the Court
adjudged the conduct of the defendant bar association illegal per
se under the same principles used to evaluate the conduct of a pri-
vate enterprise.
Applying different substantive antitrust principles to local
government defendants would mean, in effect, assessing the legal-
ity of challenged practices on the basis of not only the goal of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, as ordinarily conceived, but also on the
basis of the conflicting goals purportedly being pursued by those
defendants. It is difficult to believe the Court intended that judges
officials may be unwilling to accept the economic and political risks created by the Fifth
Circuit's decision." Brief for Petitioner at 20-21, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
147. Brief for Petitioners at 22, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389 (1978).
148. Id. at 22, 24.
149. Id. at 406-07.
150. Id. at 408.
151. Id. at 408-10 (discussing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)).
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use these differing analyses. In the first place, in National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States,152 the Court explicitly
rejected such multiple goals analysis as improper under the anti-
trust statutes. That opinion was rendered subsequent to Lafayette
and it seems unlikely the Court intended to overrule it in Boulder,
a case where the Court never raised the question of proper anti-
trust analysis."' 3 In the second place, if judges were to engage in
multiple goals analysis, they would be put to the task of balancing
noncomparable goals. They would find that task intellectually
problematic at best, and because it would not be subject to system-
atic review, a large number of judges might refuse to apply it. Bal-
ancing goals might degenerate into giving one decisive weight. If
that occurred, either local governments would be subject to the
same substantive principles as private enterprises, or local govern-
ments would enjoy functional, although not nominal, immunity,
contrary to court decisions. To reduce the risk of such degenera-
tion, judges would have to evaluate both the wisdom of the con-
flicting goals purportedly being pursued by local government de-
fendants, and the efficacy of the challenged practice in achieving
them. The Court would then be judging the reasonableness of local
government conduct much like it judged the reasonableness of
state government conduct during the heyday of substantive due
process. 154 It is unlikely that in deciding Lafayette and Boulder
the Supreme Court intended to resurrect Lochner"' and its prog-
eny; it is even less likely that lower courts will so interpret them.
A court that had found a practice lawful when engaged in by a
local government would as a practical matter be bound by Boulder
and Lafayette's "same treatment" teaching to disregard the status
of the defendant, and to find the practice lawful when engaged in
152. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). In National Society, the Court held that a canon of the Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers prohibiting members from submitting bids for engi-
neering services suppressed competition in violation of the Sherman Act, and affirmed the
lower court's granting of an injunction against the canon. Id.
153. It seems especially unlikely that the Court meant to overrule, sub silentio, Na-
tional Society in Boulder because Justice Rehnquist discussed that possibility explicitly in
his dissent. 455 U.S. 40, 65-68 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154. See Civiletti, The Fallout from Community Communications Co. v. City of Boul-
der: Prospects for a Legislative Solution, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 379, 387 (1983); Comment,
Alternative Approaches to Municipal Antitrust Liability, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 63, 81-82
(1982); cf. Note, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: The Emasculation of
Municipal Immunity from Sherman Act Liability, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 413, 433 (1983)
("Courts would be left to work with little or no guidance, attempting to give meaning to an
overly flexible distinction.").
155. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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by a private enterprise. 156 Several such findings would work a ma-
jor retrenchment in antitrust doctrine. That retrenchment would
cause antitrust's internal war to intensify. Local government prac-
tices would be almost per se legal because they would rarely, if
ever, function to reduce consumer welfare in restricting output and
raising prices. 157 But other practices, such as a vertical acquisition,
or licensing the use of a patented input solely on the basis of an
end-product royalty,5 8 would remain subject to expensive scrutiny
and frequent condemnation because local governments would sel-
dom, if ever, employ them. Such inconsistent treatment would be
difficult for judges to justify. Some of them might attempt to alle-
viate the problem by eliminating the cause of the inconsistency.
The cause represents the use of two quite different, and often con-
flicting, principles to determine the legality of practices under the
same statutes-the antitrust statutes. Judges who wished to elimi-
nate it in an intellectually respectable manner would simply choose
one of the following: either the principle of maximizing consumer
welfare, or the principle of distributing wealth in populist-pre-
ferred ways. To avert truly calamitous results, they would likely
select the first option and discard the second (and populism gener-
ally) as inapplicable to the resolution of antitrust suits against
both private enterprises and local governments. If the judiciary
makes this choice, nonstrategic conduct that had an exclusionary
effect, like the conduct challenged in the famous Alcoa case, 59
would be per se legal. 60 Franchisor-franchisee disputes would be
relegated to the realm of ordinary contract law.' e' Horizontal
156. This retrenchment would be largely consistent with Williamson's position on verti-
cal restraints. Williamson, supra note 22, at 993.
157. A court could conceivably bar a local government's practice as inconsistent with
some other federal statute under the supremacy clause, or as being unreasonably burden-
some on interstate commerce, or even contrary to the first amendment as incorporated in
the fourteenth. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney's advertise-
ment falls within scope of first amendment). Generally, those who are hurt by the practices
of local government may pursue a host of federal, as well as state, judicial remedies.
158. The Supreme Court condemned this practice in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc. and gave this case the "patent misuse" label. 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
159. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
160. For example, the refusal by a sugar-beet processor to purchase beets from any
grower who did not plant the processor's seeds would be legal, even though that conduct
might exclude other seed sellers from the market, where such restraint has significant an-
ticompetitive effects. See Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1228-30 (9th Cir.
1982).
161. Presumably, cases like Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc. would gener-
ally not reach the summary judgment stage, as Waffle House did, and the court would
promptly resolve those that did in favor of the franchisor. 734 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1984),
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mergers similar to those in Von's Grocery e2 and Rome Cable""
would survive a motion for summary judgment based on minimal
discovery. 164 Refusals by joint venturers to share the rewards of
their enterprise with their rivals165 would survive a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim. Moreover, the focus of the inquiry
in antitrust cases would shift to the challenged practice's economic
function rather than the status of the parties. That situation would
prompt even more changes. In short, this would completely reform
the common law of antitrust and turn it into an engine for promot-
ing economic efficiency.
aff'd, 1983-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) V 65,567 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
162. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
163. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
164. It appears from the 1982 Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice that
with respect to horizontal mergers, the Antitrust Division will focus on post merger concen-
tration of the market and the market shares of the merging firms to determine whether the
merger poses a significant threat to competition. Justice Department Merger Guidelines,
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, at 5-6 (June 17, 1972). Corporate executives
contemplating a horizontal acquisition, however, must be concerned about not only the An-
titrust Division but also private plaintiffs. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d
384 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). After the reformation suggested in the
text of Marathon Oil Co., presumably, companies like Marathon would be unable to invoke
the antitrust statutes in order to block acquisition attempts from companies like Mobil. 669
F.2d at 380.
165. See, e.g., Associated Press v.,United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
[Vol. 39:589
